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“Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion,  
for every opinion now accepted was once eccentric.” 
 
Bertrand Russell 
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2011 marked the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. This international legal instrument marked the first time a global permanent regime 
was established for the purpose of providing a set of guidelines to states in their relations with 
displaced persons or refugees, particularly those who found themselves in that state after the 
Second World War. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not only, it is argued in 
this paper, established the international refugee regime with a strong relation to human rights, 
but also laid the groundwork for the establishment of a norm of refugee protection as a standard 
of appropriate behaviour toward refugees. The paper aims to prove this first assertion by 
employing the Constructivist-based norm life-cycle theoretical framework advanced by Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. This paper will show that a norm of refugee protection was 
established over time but that its tenets have increasingly been ignored by states thereby 
eroding the initial norm of refugee protection. The second assertion with which this paper is 
faced therefore is that the intensity of the erosion of this norm of refugee protection is such that 
its continued existence is questionable. The norm death-series theoretical framework proposed 
by Ryder McKeown will be employed to assist in showing the level of erosion of the norm of 
refugee protection. The outcome of this latter enquiry, it is suggested, shows that the norm of 
refugee protection is in the midst of expiration owing to the adverse practices of states, 
particularly democracies such as Australia and the United States of America but not limited to 
them. The seeming expiration of the norm of refugee protection has given rise to the possibility 
of the emergence of a new norm, which unlike the initial norm identified by the norm life-cycle, is 
not founded in human rights discourse but rather in one of security and deterrence. This latter 


















1.1. Overview  
 
2011 marked the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.1 The initiation of the 1951 Refugee Convention was prompted by events occurring 
during a particularly turbulent period in history marked by two world wars, the devastating 
impact of which had never before been witnessed in living memory. This violent period, roughly 
stretching over a period of 31 years from 1914 to 1945, destabilised human society, particularly 
in Europe, and resulted in large-scale displacement of people outside the borders of their 
respective countries of origin.2 It is a conceivable argument that drafters of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention sought to develop an international regime, to direct and simultaneously regulate the 
response of states towards displaced persons, the origin of which stemmed largely from the 
effects of the preceding tumultuous period in human history. The eventual realisation of this 
regulative framework, however, was initially constrained in application, and resulted in a narrow 
application of protection for people who would otherwise qualify as a refugee except for these 
limitations placed on their recognition. The persons who were fortunate to receive the protection 
promised under the framework introduced by the 1951 Refugee Convention were those persons 
who found themselves outside the borders of their countries, only European countries as 
categorised at the time, before 1 January 1951.3 Only persons who fulfilled these two criteria 
were to receive protection from persecution that prompted these displaced persons to flee their 
homes in the first instance. 4  These persons were and still are termed “refugees.”5 
 
                                                             
1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force 22 
April 1954) [1951 Refugee Convention]. 
2 Laura Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime” (2002) 14 
(2–3) International Journal of Refugee Law 238 at 243 [Barnett].  
3 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A)–1(B). Art. 1B(1) did initially allow states party to 
declare whether they would accept obligations towards refugees that emanated beyond Europe.  
4
Ibid.  












The 1951 Refugee Convention and its provisions were heavily influenced by the provisions of 
the then newly minted human rights paradigm that rose to international prominence with the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on 10 December 1948 by 
member states of the United Nations General Assembly.6,7 It is important to note, however, that 
the problem of displaced persons was not a new phenomenon by any stretch of the imagination 
at that time.8 The 1951 Refugee Convention was, however, the first major concerted effort by 
states to provide refugee protection that comported with acceptable standards of human dignity 
and other human rights as perceived within the human rights paradigm formulated until the time 
when the 1951 Refugee Convention came to fruition.9 
 
This emerging awareness of human rights and the responsibility to protect was a viewpoint 
prominent among states and non-states entities who participated in the initial drafting of the 
1951 Refugee Convention at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1950.10 The initial limited 
application of the 1951 Refugee Convention notwithstanding, an increasing number of  states 
outside of Western Europe, the area to whom the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
                                                             
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. 
A/810 (1948) 71 [UDHR].  
7 50 member states participated in the final draft which was a substantial amount considering that 
decolonisation in Africa and Asia had not yet begun in earnest. See: “The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: History of the Document”, online: United Nations  http://www.un.org/en/documents/ 
udhr/history.shtml [UDHR: History]; Justice A.M. North & Nehal Bhuta, “The Future of Protection – The 
Role of the Judge” (2000-2001) 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 479 at 486. 
8 An example of prior movements of displaced people is that of the French Huguenots in 1685 when the 
French King revoked the Edict of Nantes that had previously granted religious freedom to all French 
citizens. The ground for persecution in this instance was therefore religious. See Barnett, supra note 2 at 
239; Alexander Betts & Gil Loescher, “Refugees in International Relations” in Alexander Betts & Gil 
Loescher, eds., Refugee in International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 7 [Betts 
& Loescher]; Erika Feller, “Asylum, Migration and Refugee Protection: Realities, Myths and the Promise 
of Things to Come” (2006) 18(3-4) International Journal of Refugee Law 509 at 510 [Feller]. 
9 A large proportion of the rights contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention are commensurate with the 
rights contained in the International Bill of Human Rights, including the right to equal treatment, freedom 
of religion, and freedom of association. The International Bill of Human Rights is an unofficial grouping of 
human rights-based international legal instruments meant to shape the global human rights paradigm. 
The instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See:  UDHR, 
supra note 6; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 [ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.3 [ICESCR].  
10 The Conference of Plenipotentiaries was held from 2 – 25 July 1951 on the instruction of the UN 
General Assembly who passed a resolution to draft an international convention that would deal with the 
question of the status of refugees. See: 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, Preamble; Feller, supra 
note 8 at 524; Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, GA Res. 429(V), UN GAOR, 5th 












was largely to apply,11 sporadically began to adopt the 1951 Refugee Convention before 1967, 
particularly states in Latin America and the newly decolonised states in Africa at the time.12, 13  
 
The passage of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967,14 however, removed 
the temporal and geographical limitations superimposed onto the original 1951 Refugee 
Convention.15 Even more states subsequently began to accept either one or both of the two 
central international law instruments as a guide to the provision of protection to refugees.16 
Some states also pursued adherence to regional instruments such as the Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central 
America, Mexico and Panama,17 in Latin America and the Organisation of African Unity‟s (OAU) 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,18 both of which 
provides for the protection of refugees along similar lines as the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol thereto.19   
 
                                                             
11
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A).  
12 States such as Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo  and Cote D‟Ivoire in 
Africa and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador in Latin America all signed and ratified or acceded to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention before 1967. See:  List of States Party to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and 1967 Protocol, online: United Nations Treaty Collection <http://treaties.un.org> [List of States Party to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol].  
13 For a state to become a party to an international treaty such as the 1951 Refugee Convention it must 
either sign and later ratify its intention to be bound by the principles contained in the Convention or it must 
accede to the Convection‟s principles where signature and ratification are thought to take place 
simultaneously. See: D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2010) [Harris]; John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective, 3rd ed. 
(Lansdowne, South Africa: Juta, 2005) [Dugard]; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th 
ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) [Brownlie]. 
14 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force 4 
October 1967) [1967 Protocol]. 
15 It should be noted that art. 1(3) of the 1967 Protocol allows for states party to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention who previously accepted the provisions of art. 1(B)(1)(a) of that Convention to be immune 
from the effects of art. 1(2) of the 1967 Protocol. See: Ibid. at art. 1(3); 1951 Refugee Convention, supra 
note 1, art. 1(B)(1)(a). 
16
List of States Party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 12. 
17 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central 
America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984, online: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ [Cartagena 
Declaration]; Barnett, supra note 2 at 248; Feller, supra note 8 at 524.    
18 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September 1969, 100 
U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force 20 June 1974) [OAU Convention]; Feller, supra note 8 at 524. 
19
The OAU Convention, in fact, expanded upon the grounds that could be raised to incur a state‟s 












The passage of time has not left the foundations of the refugee regime, and more specifically 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto, untouched by the political sphere, 
both domestically and internationally. The refugees under the original 1951 Refugee Convention 
generally shared an ethnic affinity with host states as the focus of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
fell on displaced persons within Europe.20 Host states were also faced with tremendous 
economic and social developmental challenges that would benefit from an additional source of 
human capital after the devastation wrought by the Second World War.21 The United States of 
America (US), however, initially catered their domestic laws towards only recognising refugees 
emanating from either the Middle East or known Communist states,22 the wider-ranging 
provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the later 1967 Protocol thereto 
notwithstanding.23 In fact, refugees from the Communist Bloc were welcomed and their 
acceptance was lauded as an ideological victory over Communism.24 The international refugee 
regime arguably therefore became a politically charged playground in contrast to a seemingly 
idealistically envisaged altruistic community of genuinely concerned states. 25 
 
After the end of the Cold War, the world bore witness to increasing numbers of displaced people 
in most parts of the world. These displaced people included those caused by continued ethnic 
conflict in decolonised Africa.26  The 1990s also saw the mass movement of refugees from the 
                                                             
20The exception created by art. 1(B)(1)(b), however, is apposite to remember here. This does not, 
however, detract from the fact that the creation of a new international refugee regime was brought about 
as a response to the devastat ng consequences of the Second World War as they applied to displaced 
persons in Europe.  See: 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1. 
21 Janina W. Dacyl, “A Time for Perestroika (Restructuring) in the International Refugee Regime?” (1990) 
3(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 26 at 38 [Dacyl]. 
22 The Refugee-Escape Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639; Hart-Cellar Act, INS, Act of 1965, 
Pub.L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 [Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965]; Marc R. Rosenblum & Idean 
Salehyan, “Norms and Interests in US Asylum Enforcement” (2004) 41(6) Journal of Peace Research 677 
at 683 [Rosenblum & Salehyan].    
23 The Communist and Middle East specification was removed by the Refugee Act of 1980. See: Michael 
J. Parrish, “Redefining the Refugee: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a Basis for Refugee 
Protection” (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 223 at 235 [Parrish]; Idean Salehyan & Marc R. Rosenblum, 
“International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Asylum Admissions in the United States” (2008) 61(1) 
Political Research Quarterly 104 at 106 [Salehyan & Rosenblum]. 
24
Ahilan T. Arulanantham, “Restructured Safe Havens: A Proposal for Reform of the Refugee Protection 
System” (2000) 22(1) Human Rights Quarterly 1 at 12 [Arulanantham]. 
25 Ibid. 
26 The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is apposite to mention here. Ethnic conflict has, however, also been 
rife in the general Great Lakes region too. See: Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: 












Balkans, precipitated by amongst other reasons, ethnic-based persecution in the area.27 This 
era also saw increasing numbers of persons in “refugee-like” situations, that is, persons who 
find themselves in situations similar to those of recognised refugees but for the lack of legal 
recognition for their condition.28 The plight of refugees and those displaced persons in “refugee-
like” situations has remained in the forefront of international consciousness, including since the 
end of the Cold War. The pressing nature of the refugee problem notwithstanding, “compassion 
fatigue” has nevertheless been identified over time in the responses of states towards displaced 
persons.29  
  
It is suggested that compassion fatigue, amongst other factors, has been responsible for 
facilitating an ever-more prominent tendency among numerous states party to the international 
refugee regime to question the regime‟s prescriptive framework and t  challenge the nature and 
scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention, particularly its central tenant of refugee protection.30 
The practices of states arguably therefore began to stretch, the bounds of good faith 
interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention‟s provisions and its objects and purposes.31 
Deviations included the enactment of increasingly restrictive measures in the form of pernicious 
domestic laws that stretched the limits of acceptable interpretations of the provisions of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto.32 These domestic laws sanctioned the 
creation of often insurmountable barriers to entry into possible host states.33 People claiming 
asylum have also been detained in various states around the world, arguably beyond 
                                                             
27 Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York: 
Oxford University Press: 1993) at 1 [Loescher(a)]; Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and 
Genocide in Bosnia (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1998). 
28 Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2001) at 153 [Loescher(b)].  
29 Dacyl, supra note 21 at 37; Barnett, supra note 2 at 261. 
30 The focus on national security and the passage of national legislation that skirts on the edge of 
classifying legitimate refugees as criminals in the post 9/11 era, particularly in the United States are 
examples of such challenges. See Chapter 4 infra. 
31Even if states are not party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that enjoins good faith 
interpretation, some of the treaty‟s provisions are considered a codification of customary international law. 
See: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 27 
January 1980), art. 31 [VCLT]; Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. 
Senegal), Judgement of 12 November 1991, [1991] I.C.J. Rep. 53 at para 48; Case Concerning the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement of 25 September 1997, [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 
7 at para 46.    
32 Betts & Loescher, supra note 8. 
33 Sadako Ogata, “Upholding international refugee protection principles today” (Address to the Law 
Association for Asia and the Pacific 18th Conference, delivered at Tokyo, Japan, September 2003), 












reasonable measure as implored by the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
1967 Protocol thereto, pending their successful application for refugee status.34 Most important 
of all, states have engaged in practices that flagrantly violate the principle of non-refoulement, a 
central tenet of refugee protection.35 Examples of these practices include interdiction at sea and 
direct return, practices that may also amount to chain refoulement.36  
 
The clearly discernable contradictory nature of instances of state practice notwithstanding, the 
United Nations General Assembly passed a Resolution to celebrate the occasion of the 50 th 
anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention‟s adoption which reaffirmed the commitment of 
member states to the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
thereto.37 The sincerity of this Resolution is, however, questionable when juxtaposed with state 
practice both prior and subsequent to the passage of this Resolution by the United Nations 
General Assembly. 
 
The first decade of the 21st century in particular has borne witness to ever-increasing violations 
of the provisions of the refugee regime most prominently as it pertains to states that ought to 
comport with recognised human rights standards.38 The dilution of refugee protection by way of 
its subversion to state security interests at the cost of genuine refugee protection in particular 
has been brought about by the response of states to the atrocities of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.39 
This latter trend is still evident in the continued state practices aimed at deterring displaced 
                                                             
34 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 31(1); Chapter 4, infra.  
35 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(1). 
36 Penelope Mathew, “Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa” (2002) 96 American 
Journal of International Law 661 at 666 [Mathew]; Letter from Bill Frelick, Refugee Program Director for 
Human Rights Watch and Brad Adams, Asia Division Executive Director to António Guterres, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (13 June 2011) online: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/13/letter-unhcr-regarding-refugeeasylum-seeker-exchange-agreement-
between-australia-and; Choe Sang-Hun, “China Should Not Repatriate North Korean Refugees, Seoul 
Says” The New York Times (22 February 2012), online: The New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/asia/seoul-urges-china-to-not-return-north-korean-
refugees.html  [Sang-Hun]. 
37 UN GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/187 (2002) [UNGA Resolution]. 
38 See Chapter 4 infra. 
39 Andrew I. Schoenholtz, “Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11” (2004-2005) 36 












persons and arguably legitimate refugees from claiming asylum and commensurate protection 
from possible host states.40 
 
1.2. Research Aims 
 
Taking due cognisance of the state of the international refugee regime as it developed from the 
inception of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the eventual passage of the 1967 Protocol 
thereto, all related international, domestic and regional human rights-centred instruments,41 and 
the state of the current regime, this research paper broadly aims to track the evolution of a norm 
of refugee protection particularly commencing in the post-Second World War period until the 
present day amid the ever-increasing complexity of the international legal and political 
landscape. 
 
The stated aim provides four broad-based categories of consideration. First, the concept of 
tracking would imply that the existence of a certain phenomenon is to be followed over a period 
of time. Second, evolution implies the presence of change over time within the content of the 
phenomenon.42 Evolution therefore implies at the very least, it is suggested, that something did 
exist at the advent of the enquiry so as to realistically realize the process of evolution. Third, the 
entity or phenomenon at the centre of the enquiry is the norm of refugee protection. Evolution of 
this norm therefore implies that a norm or some form thereof, although perhaps not officially 
realised as such, existed at the commencement of the enquiry but that the content of the norm 
has changed over time. Given the crucial goal of proving the existence of a norm, its content 
comes under close scrutiny as a means to prove the actual existence of a norm. Fourth, the 
content of refugee protection is a crucial consideration to effectively prove the existence of the 
norm of refugee protection and the changing nature of its content over time as it evolves in 
response to actions taken by role players, including states. 
                                                             
40 See Chapter 4 infra. 
41
ICCPR, supra note 9; ICESCR, supra note 9; UDHR, supra note 6; OAU Convention, supra note 18; 
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force 21 
October 1986). 













In the light of the intended purpose of this research paper, therefore, the following interrelated 
hypotheses will be advanced: (1) an initial norm of refugee protection developed  under the 
international refugee law regime; (2) state practice began to deviate from this norm and 
facilitated the erosion of the initial norm of refugee protection whose establishment is advanced 
in (1); (3) the development of an alternate norm of refugee protection, increasingly disconnected 
from its human rights roots, has subsequently been initiated. 
 
1.3. Theoretical Framework  
 
To realise the overarching aim of the research paper, the paper will first analyse the 
international refugee regime and the practice of states, particularly those party to the respective 
legal instruments concerned, through the lens of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink‟s norm 
life-cycle and its various stages of norm development, including norm emergence, norm 
cascade and norm internalisation.43 In the second instance, the practice of states will be 
observed through the tenets of the norm death-series, a comparatively new and untested 
framework advanced by Ryder McKeown,44 so as to determine whether the norm of refugee 
protection as initially advanced under the norm life-cycle is subject to expiration under the three 
stages of the norm death-series. These three stages are the revisionist challenge, the reverse 
cascade and norm expiration respectively.45 A second, brief application of the norm life-cycle 
will be undertaken to consider the possible emergence of a new norm of refugee protection, one 
which is not wholly commensurate with the intended purposes of the refugee regime. The 
purpose of these exercises in application of theoretical frameworks is to track the evolution of a 
norm of refugee protection in the early stages of the 1951 Refugee Convention‟s existence to 
the present day. A further consideration of these theoretical frameworks will be presented in 
chapter 2 of this research. 
  
                                                             
43 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 52 
(4) International Organization 887 [Finnemore & Sikkink]. 
44 Ryder McKeown, “Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm” (2009) 













1.4. Methodology  
 
To fulfill the research aims of this paper, both primary and secondary literary sources will be 
assessed. Primary sources include, but are not necessarily limited to, international and regional 
legal instruments such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol thereto, the United 
Nations Charter,46 the outcomes of domestic court cases and legislation, press releases and 
letters. Secondary sources include journal articles, books, working papers and newspaper 
articles. The information pulled from these sources will be employed according to the applicable 
theoretical framework as laid out under the theoretical framework section.47  
 
The case studies presented in Chapter 4 of this paper, although seemingly comparative in 
nature, serve not as a means of direct comparison between the two countries employed, the US 
and Australia, but rather as two evident examples that serve to highlight the array of practices 
that have proliferated over time on the part of states in an attempt to challenge, both directly and 
indirectly, the intended effect of the standards governing the international refugee regime. The 
choice of using the US as a case study in relation to this field is a logical one given the pre-
eminent nature of its international stature, taking into account its power relationships and the 
sheer number of people who seek to access its protective network under the auspices of 
refugee protection. Although the justifica ion of employing Australia as a case study in this paper 
is somewhat more questionable, three factors nevertheless suggest the effectiveness of 
considering the brief Australian case study. These three factors include: the strategic 
geographical placement of Australia in relation to the refugee-producing South-East Asian 
region, the democratic nature of the Australian state and therefore its seemingly human rights 
character and, somewhat contradictory to the prior factor, Australia‟s creative and well-
publicised practices to evade responsibility under the international refugee regime in recent 
times. Although European states such as Germany may present an equally justifiable case 
study, its ties with the complex regional superstructure, the European Union, requires perhaps a 
greater array of theoretical consideration beyond the Constructivist nature of this paper. This 
latter task is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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The international refugee regime is a contentious field of operation, both in practice and 
academically. As to the latter point, the issue of refugee protection therefore provides many 
avenues of potentially fruitful academic investigation. A consideration of the validity of the 
contentious refugee definition as contained in Article 1(A) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
as incorporated in the 1967 Protocol thereto,48 however, is beyond the scope of this paper‟s 
consideration. Furthermore, persons in “refugee-like” situations such as internally displaced 
persons,49 although falling within the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),50 is therefore also beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Additionally, this paper will not undertake a consideration of the varied status determination 
procedures commensurate with being recognised as a refugee. Similarly, this paper will not 
investigate the contours of solutions to the refugee problem once a person has either been 
recognised as a refugee or been rejected from such classification.  
The paper will also not undertake an expanded consideration of the role of the UNHCR within 
the refugee regime. This research paper is also limited to the temporal period beginning around 
the time of the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention until the present day. Reference to 
earlier time periods is limited to a historical timeline and is not central to the aim of this thesis 
but merely meant as background information for the development of arguments pertaining to the 
refugee regime from 1951 until the present day. 
 
1.6. Chapter Outline 
 
Finally, to realise the research aims of this paper and the hypotheses advanced in conjunction 
thereto, the paper will be structured into four chapters in addition to this introductory overview 
chapter. The second chapter is structured into two main sections. The first part will provide an 
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overview of Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm life-cycle to be applied in this research.51 The second 
part will focus on Ryder McKeown‟s proposed norm death-series.52 Both sections will also 
contain critical considerations as they relate to particular stages of the mentioned theoretical 
frameworks.  
 
The third chapter will first define important concepts and then build on the factual overview 
provided in the introductory chapter. It will be argued that a norm of refugee protection as 
advocated in its original conception did in fact develop. To achieve this end the norm life-cycle 
will be applied in its various constitutive stages.   
 
The fourth chapter will similarly commence with a factual overview of state practice particularly 
pertaining to the latter part of the 20th and early 21st century. Particular focus will be given to 
state practice in Australia and the United States. The chapter will then move to an application of 
McKeown‟s norm death-series to support the argument that the initial norm of refugee protection 
as argued for in chapter three has been severely eroded and expiration is seemingly a feasible 
endpoint. A subsequent, second application of Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm life-cycle will 
follow with the purpose of highlighting the possible emergence of a new norm of refugee 
protection the content of which is largely inconsistent with the initial norm of refugee protection, 
particularly as it relates to the human rights paradigm.  
 
The final chapter will conclude by presenting the cumulative findings of the research undertaken 
in conjunction with its aims and will propose areas in which further research ought to be 
conducted to develop a dynamic approach to the international refugee regime and state 
practice. 
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In order to fulfill the research aims of this paper laid out in the preceding introductory chapter, 
the theoretical framework of Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm life-cycle will be employed.53  This 
theoretical framework will provide a basis through which to consider whether or not an initial 
norm of refugee protection has indeed been formulated and established. The norm life-cycle 
framework is, however, not the only framework through which to consider the initial 
development and changing nature of norms.  
 
Recent scholarship has focused on the possibility of norm regression in opposition to the norm 
progress propagated by Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm life-cycle model. Ryder McKeown has 
framed a particular incarnation of this norm regression research as the norm death-series.54 
This framework proposes a mechanism through which to track the regression of an existing 
norm until its ultimate expiration or “death.”55 This relatively new and untested framework 
provides an opportunity to track the regression of a norm and in so doing it can open up space 
for the development of a new norm along the path prescribed by the norm life-cycle. The two 
frameworks are therefore arguably complementary and will be outlined hereunder.56 Some 
points of contention with regards to the precepts of each stage of both the norm life-cycle and 
norm death-series will be considered. 
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2.2. Conceptualisation  
 
The norm-life cycle draws its antecedents from the social theory of Constructivism where 
Constructivism is broadly centred on the importance of norms as determinants of state identity 
and interests and ultimately state behaviour.57 It follows that norms are therefore endogenous to 
state behaviour. The focus of Constructivism generally is therefore on ideational factors as 
opposed to the realist and liberalist schools. These latter theories regard norms as exogenous 
to state behaviour and rather pins the determination of state behaviour on considerations of 
power, whether hard or soft, and subsequent interests to achieve a favourable balance of power 
relationship.58  
 
Given these considerations, the norm life-cycle, contrary to the overwhelming focus on power by 
the theories cited above, is a model that propagates change or evolution in the international 
system through its consideration of changing norms. Norms as implicated within the context of 
the norm life-cycle facilitates change through a change in intersubjectively-held meanings within 
a community thereby influencing the nature of its consequent behaviour within the international 
community of states.59 This normative turn reflects the Constructivist nature of the norm life-
cycle.  
 
Any further consideration of the norm life-cycle framework propagated by Finnemore and 
Sikkink first requires a closer consideration of the definitional contours of a norm. A norm is 
most generally and briefly defined as a standard of appropriate behaviour.60 The “appropriate” 
label is afforded to the actions of a state by the perceptions of the community within which the 
norm operates.61 A norm therefore implicates a certain behavioural logic shared within a 
community.62  
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In this regard, the logic of appropriateness refers to the pursuit of behaviour that conforms to the 
standards of a community and will ultimately give rise to legitimate action.63 Behaviour arising 
from this logic may arguably not always ascribe to standards of rationality, a state of affairs 
more commonly associated with the logic of consequence where the costs and benefits of a 
certain strand of action is analysed before it is undertaken.64 Behaviour resulting from this 
consideration generally aims to maximise the utility of the actor undertaking the action, the 
possible lack of legitimacy of subsequent actions notwithstanding.65  
 
The operation of the respective behavioural logics, as briefly considered above, is not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, a fact borne out by rational-constructivism.66 Rational-
constructivism provides some space for consideration of costs and benefits attendant on the 
actions of an actor, here the state, in the initial stages of determining whether a certain norm 
ought to be followed, that is, rationales as to the usefulness of adherence to the norm as a 
means to solve a perceived problem is considered.67 A consideration of material consequences 
is therefore undertaken and accords with the suggestion by Finnemore and Sikkink that 
“rationality cannot be separated from any politically significant episode of…normative change.”68 
Considerations of rationality can therefore arguably influence the formation of a norm.69 
 
The abovementioned behavioural logics notwithstanding, an additional characteristic of a norm 
that bears consideration is its prescriptive nature,70 in that it prescribes what ought to occur as 
opposed to what is occurring, but this does not arguably entail the moral goodness of the norm‟s 
character. In fact, the content of a norm may be decidedly immoral if the community within 
which it operates approves of its existence as being appropriate, that is, the intersubjective 
meaning ascribed to the norm also imbues the norm at hand with its consequent degree of 
moral goodness. This possible immoral grounding of a norm is borne out through the example 
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of Nazi Germany and the acceptance of Hitler‟s view of superiority of the Arian race and hence 
the subsequent programme of eradicating so-called unacceptable deviations from this racial 
grouping.71 It is therefore arguable that the logic of appropriateness which informs the 
Constructivist normative paradigm does not necessarily require a morally just foundation but 
rather an amoral one in the sense of being morally neutral. This paper will therefore not render a 
judgment on the moral justness of the norms which it seeks to identify. 
 
A final factor that ought to be placed under consideration to prevent possible future confusion is 
the delineation between international and domestic norms. The central focus of this study is on 
international norms, a feature commensurate with the prescriptions of the norm life-cycle.72 
However, while international norms are those norms that operate in the international society of 
states, it is still prudent to recognise that these international norms may derive some of their 
content from domestic norms held within the domestic community of various states. A change in 
a domestic norm may therefore eventually exert some influence and facilitate subsequent 
change in an international norm. This latter point is commensurate with the suggestion by 
McKeown, in his exposition of the norm death-series, that a domestic crisis of legitimacy as it 
relates to a norm precedes an international crisis of legitimacy as it may be held within the 
international community of states.73 Cumulatively, it is therefore important to recognise that a 
causal link may exist between international and domestic norms, not in the way that they are 
constructed but rather in their content. 
 
Additionally, the focus on the development of international norms within the international political 
system highlights the centrality of the state as the most prevalent unit of analysis in this 
instance. As such the international norms propagated under the strand of research dealing with 
the norm life-cycle can be deemed to be held by states. A state‟s views are generally 
represented by its ruling governmental elite. The influence of non-state actors such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) should not, however, be discounted as they have in recent 
times become increasingly more prominent players on the international stage.74 It is therefore 
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not completely illogical to ascribe a role to non-state actors such as NGOs, particularly 
prominent trans-national NGOs who are well-organised and well-funded, in the establishment of 
international norms, particularly at the early stages of a norm‟s development.  
 
Given the varied conceptual considerations posited in the immediately preceding sections, an 
outline of the norm life-cycle propagated by Finnemore and Sikkink is now apposite followed by 
a consideration of the main tenets of the norm death-series as propagated by Ryder McKeown. 
 
2.3. Norm Life-Cycle 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink posit that the development of a norm can be tracked within the 
parameters of three particular consecutive stages of development: norm emergence, norm 
cascade and norm internalization.75 It is further argued that norms do not come into existence in 
a vacuum but rather competes with other norms to obtain relative influence.76  The three stage 
construction of the norm life-cycle also allows one to consider aspects of change within 
international politics.77 The question as to how norms change is therefore central in the norm 
life-cycle framework and is of central importance for the realisation of the aims laid out for this 
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2.3.1. Norm Emergence  
 
The initial stage of the framework concerns itself with norm emergence. This stage is arguably 
the most critical and determinative of all three stages in terms of the form and content of the 
norm. Norm entrepreneurs are the most prominent actors during this stage and initially frame an 
issue in the face of a host of competing ones.79 These issues can be deemed important for a 
varied array of purposes including those of “empathy, altruism or ideational conviction”.80 Norm 
entrepreneurs regard the issues they propagate as standards of appropriate behaviour which 
the broader public or society of states ought to adhere to so as to address a problem they have 
identified.81 Norm entrepreneurs consequently lobby and persuade states to adopt their crafted 
issues as a norm by advancing particular rationales to states that casts adherence to the this 
tentative norm in a favourable light relative to other, competing emergent norms.82  
 
Norm entrepreneurs are most often non-state actors such as NGOs but are arguably not limited 
to this grouping.83 States, through their elected or appointed representatives such as ministers, 
their deputies or other high-level bureaucrats, have been known to fulfill the functions of a norm 
entrepreneur.84 This is particularly evident in the case of Scandinavian countries such as 
Norway and Sweden who have, for example, undertaken the task of advancing peaceful 
resolution to disputes and adherence to a norm of peace and provision of developmental aid.85 
These countries have undertaken this role as they exert relatively little influence in other areas 
within the international system.86  
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Norm entrepreneurs, furthermore, utilise certain organisational platforms through which they can 
propagate adherence to their respective norms.87 Organisational platforms are understood as 
pre-existing bases from which a norm entrepreneur can proceed to persuade states that their 
norm is preferable to adoption relative to other competing norms.88 Platforms are not all the 
same and provide different tools to assist norm entrepreneurs in the realisation of their 
respective mandates.89  Organisational platforms for such purposes are generally provided by 
inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and NGOS such as the United Nations (UN) and 
Amnesty International respectively.90 However, it is arguable that Global Governance Networks 
(GGNs) such as those advanced by Anne-Marie Slaughter can also constitute a relevant 
organisational platform through which the desired influence can be exerted by bureaucrats as 
both state representatives and norm entrepreneurs so as to generate growing compliance with 
and adherence to the norm being peddled.91  
 
GGNs are described by Slaughter as being a community of bureaucrats from various state 
jurisdictions that come together and share ideas and experiences amongst each other, often on 
an informal basis.92 This gathering of bureaucrats provides a platform through which its 
members are socialised into particular international norms.93 As such, these networks also 
serve as a useful mechanism through which international norms can become internalised within 
the domestic realm of states.94 Bureaucrats as the administrative arm of the government are 
generally “uniquely positioned” within the policy-making process within a state and can arguably 
bring their influence to bear in favour of adopting the norm to which they had previously been 
exposed through their membership and participation in a GGN.95  
 
Similar power dynamics may however operate within a GGN as those dynamics that operate 
within the global power structure as a whole. Consequently, bureaucrats from states that wield 
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relatively more power may be able to influence other members even if such powerful 
bureaucrats peddle a norm which is not necessarily in the best interests of the adopting state. 
The method of inculcation employed may therefore be one of coercion in addition to the more 
subtle avenues of persuasion.96  
 
The process of the norm life-cycle further asserts that norm entrepreneurs continue the pursuit 
of their mandate until a critical mass of states97  has come to adopt the norm as an appropriate 
standard of behaviour, that is, norm entrepreneurs have been successful in “crafting a coherent 
rationale in support of…[the proposed] norm”.98 When a critical mass of states has come to 
adhere to the norm concerned, a tipping point is reached.99 This tipping point lies on the border 
of the initial stage of norm emergence and the subsequent second stage of norm cascade.100 
Once the tipping point has therefore been realised, a norm cascade is underway towards the 
third stage of eventual internalisation.101   
 
The definition of critical mass is, however, open to contestation and can attract two broad 
conceptions, one in terms of quantity and the other in terms of quality. Finnemore and Sikkink 
propose that generally a critical mass of states entail that roughly a third of all states should 
have adopted the norm as a standard of appropriate behaviour.102 This conception of quantity 
may arguably not always be determinative of critical mass as certain issues with which norm 
entrepreneurs are concerned may not affect particular states at all or may affect them in a 
disproportionate manner, that is, the relative bearing and influence of a state in an issue area 
may be more weighty than for other states.103 The quality measure in this context can arguably 
refer to the phenomenon of adherence by critical states or norm champions or what is otherwise 
referred to as specially affected states.104 States that fall into this category are those that have 
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particular vested interests within an issue area marked by certain norms.105 Given these 
arguments, quality as a measure of critical mass may therefore be a viable alternative measure. 
 
Regardless of the definition ascribed to critical mass, once it has been reached, a tipping point 
occurs.106 Employing the metaphor of a weighing balance scale, the tipping point refers to the 
moment when a sufficient amount of weight has been placed upon one side of the scale such 
that it tips to that side. Once this moment occurs, the norm can be said to have cascaded and 
the second stage of norm development has been entered. 
 
2.3.2. Norm Cascade 
 
A norm cascade is marked by the large-scale acceptance and adherence to the norm being 
peddled by norm entrepreneurs in the first stage of development.107 This means that the 
rationales advanced by norm entrepreneurs in the norm emergence stage are increasingly 
accepted as valid bases for action.108 At the beginning of the norm cascade only a relatively 
small number of states may, however, ascribe to the tenets of the norm under consideration. 
This arguably depends on whether so-called critical states adhere to the norm or whether the 
sheer number of states is sufficient for a critical mass and a consequent tipping point to occur. 
This intricacy notwithstanding, the norm cascade stage is marked by the continued socialisation 
of states into acceptance of and adherence to the norm being peddled, where socialisation can 
be defined as the means through which states are “induced to change their behaviour by 
adopting those norms preferred by an international society of states”.109 This socialisation is 
conducted by norm champion states – states that are considered as norm leaders in this 
stage.110 
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Motivation for succumbing to socialisation can be found in the pursuit of legitimacy, esteem and 
more often than not a morally cognisant reputation within the eyes of the international 
community.111 This connects with the logic of appropriateness associated with normative 
frameworks relative to the behavioural logic of consequence.  
 
Apart from the motivation for succumbing to socialisation, there are also various means through 
which states can arguably be induced to align their behaviour to that required by the norm.  
Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that norm leaders‟ positive experience with the norm ought to 
facilitate socialisation, albeit with these leaders‟ active knowledge of assuming that mantle or 
not.112 In other words, socialisation may therefore occur through the process of emulation 
whereby the states have observed the adoption of the norm by a relevant state and have 
witnessed the advantageous effects drawn from such norm acceptance and adherence.113 
These states have therefore undertaken a period of vicarious experience, successful completion 
of which entails their adoption of the norm. Such states therefore bandwagon with the states 
that carry initial persuasive normative weight, albeit unwittingly.114 This process lies squarely 
within the wisdom purportedly propagated by the late German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
when he stated that “fools learn by experience; wise men learn by other people‟s experience”.115 
 
Additionally, however, states that are already adherents to the propagated norm may also be 
able to expose the gap that sometimes appears between as yet non-adherent states‟ rhetoric 
and state practice in relation to the norm. This exposure is commensurate with naming-and-
shaming practices and may allow seemingly less powerful states the ability to censure the 
actions of states that are at cross-purposes with the actions sanctioned as appropriate under 
the relevant norm.116 This naming-and-shaming ability is not, however, limited to states that 
genuinely adhere to the norm, and practice what they preach. Furthermore, NGOs like Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International and IGOs such as the United Nations may be able to 
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point out the failure of states to bring their practice in line with their professed rhetoric of 
adherence. Censure of this nature, together with a desire to attain legitimacy, esteem and a 
positive reputation, may prompt such non-complying states to start complying with the norm 
being peddled of their own volition, although begrudgingly in some cases.117 
 
Although the motivation for succumbing to socialisation may lie in the pursuit of legitimacy, 
esteem and reputation, the means by which this is achieved may not solely lie with the 
demonstrably positive effect of adherence to the norm by norm leaders or the ability to name-
and-shame. Coercion and persuasion by norm leaders in this stage as a means to achieve 
socialisation is apposite to consider here since it would arguably simply be different methods 
through which to achieve socialisation. It should not be confined to the norm emergence stage 
for use by norm entrepreneurs. Coercion is not situated within the paradigm of violence but 
rather through methods such as economic sanctions since the legitimate use of force for 
purpose other than instances of self-defense has been outlawed under international law.118 
Persuasion could also conceivably proceed through less overt means such as acceptance of 
the norm as a precondition to the granting of aid.119 States that are not receptive to these 
methods may be labeled as rogue or pariah states and their stature within the international 
community of states may receive a severe bl w that may have knock-on effects in that state‟s 
international relations particularly within the economic and trade structure.120 
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Overall, however, it must be mentioned that there have been instances in the past where states, 
despite incurring the sanction of other states within the international community, have opted for 
continued failure to adhere to a norm, particularly one based within the human rights context. In 
fact, the United States is such an example within the context of the declaration of war on Iraq 
and the use of torture as a purportedly legitimate interrogation technique in the post 9/11 era.121 
Censure for such norm violating actions may not always have a demonstrable impact on the 
rogue state as they are either too powerful, particularly economically, or other considerations 
enter into the equation that has no apparent connection to the issue under the spotlight but 
rather may sour relations between the two states to the detriment of the country not guilty of 
violating the relevant norm concerned. This particular situation therefore poses a conundrum 
and ought to be investigated further. However, this endeavour ought to take place at another 
juncture as such research aims lie beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
A last point that requires some close consideration is the likelihood of a norm being accepted by 
an ever-increasing number of states. It is arguable that the form and content of the norm exerts 
some level of influence on the likelihood of a norm being accepted by states in general. 
Finnemore and Sikkink contend that the content, clarity and specificity of a norm have a bearing 
on the likelihood of a norm being adopted int  the international system.122 However, specificity 
in particular is often an elusive pursuit within the international law and indeed the wider 
diplomatic arena as international agreements are often formulated in broad strokes so as to 
attract the adherence of a greater number of states. This broad strokes approach has arguably 
encouraged the proliferation of a multitude of sometimes dubious of treaty provisions as one of 
the sources of international law. In addition, the prevailing international normative environment 
also has substantial bearing on the probability of a norm being adopted by states, that is, the 
“lens of circumstance” plays a role.123 This also resonates with the contention that norms are not 
born into a vacuum.124  
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2.3.3. Norm Internalisation 
 
Norm internalisation is the final stage of the norm life-cycle.125 It appears at the far end of the 
norm cascade when a particular norm becomes widely accepted within the international 
community as the appropriate standard of behaviour.126 Fitzsimmons argues that internalisation 
of a norm occurs when a norm has continually cascaded until the rationale initially advanced by 
the relevant norm entrepreneurs during the norm emergence stage becomes uncontested and 
accepted as legitimate assumptions.127 The norm under consideration therefore becomes part of 
the everyday dialogue in that its presence and implications are subsequently taken for granted 
not in the sense that it is ignored but rather that adherence to its precepts are taken as an 
unquestionable duty and is not necessarily open to deviation. Cumulatively, therefore, a norm at 
this stage of development within the norm life-cycle is generally considered to be both powerful 
and difficult to define as a result of the taken-for-granted quality identifiable with this stage of the 
norm life-cycle.128 Fitzsimmons does, however, caution that “it can be extremely difficult to 
discern whether a norm has been truly internali[s]ed.”129 
 
The definition of this third stage of the norm life-cycle upon first read seems relatively simple 
and plausible, that is, a norm is internalised when compliance with its prescriptions are taken for 
granted.130 There are, however, contentions that ought to be highlighted in this regard. It is 
apposite to mention here that all norms are not always equal in appeal and may not necessarily 
reach the third stage of norm internalisation in the norm life-cycle.131 That is, the norm may 
simply be too volatile or contentious to attract the level of consistent support from states 
commensurate with a taken-for-granted character ascribed to internalised norms in Finnemore 
and Sikkink‟s conception thereof. Similarly, the norm‟s development trajectory may be 
intercepted by another norm that consequently erodes state adherence and subscription to the 
initial norm, that is, the initial rationale for compliance may be regarded with growing 
skepticism.132 This does not necessarily imply that the norm itself has become irrelevant in the 
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larger scheme of things in that it is not further required for the achievement of human 
betterment, for instance, where this is required or that it is no longer held by a majority of 
weaker states that may have been subjected to disproportionately strong influence from other 
more influential states within the international community of states. It is arguable, furthermore, 
that this very point requires that one at least consider a norm even if it does not completely 
adhere to the tenets of the third stage of the norm life-cycle in that the norm may nevertheless 
be of cardinal importance within the international political arena not only as a single issue-area 
but also as one linked with other areas where there are norms that have arguably internalised. It 
is here that the concept of adjacent norms as mentioned by Finnemore and Sikkink becomes 
relevant.133 For example, refugee protection may arguably not be a norm relevant in its own 
right but its connection with the international and domestic security regime and the international 
human rights regime may make its consideration a necessity nonetheless. 
 
The second consideration, which is loosely related to the first consideration, that ought to be 
entertained requires some substantiation but nevertheless remains a valid. The norm life-cycle 
suggests that there is a convergence towards a specific norm and that it becomes entrenched 
within the actions of states without question.134 Equally, norms that do not inspire such 
convergence can therefore arguably be c nsidered as having failed to internalise. This 
assumption, however, can be fallacious, particularly within the international system as it exists 
today. It is highly improbable that dictates of actions will forever remain accepted; regardless of 
the moral acceptability such dictates may seem to carry. The world has been subjected to 
increased interconnectedness under the auspice of globalisation and as such a greater array of 
factors possesses the ability to influence the nature and pace of change within international 
politics. The very nature of international politics is therefore highly fluid and not as static as one 
would expect under the definition ascribed to internalisation under the norm life-cycle. There 
may never be enough time for a norm to internalise to the point of being taken for granted, 
especially given the emergence of competing centres of international power enshrined in 
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different conceptions of culture and society and the proliferation of players that wield that power 
on the international stage.135 
 
A further argument which can generally be lodged in relation to the operation of the norm 
internationalisation stage suggests that the activation of the internalisation stage, although 
characterised by the taken-for-granted quality of the norm under consideration, may occur in a 
staggered fashion and in fact not in a collective sense as is arguably suggested by the linear 
model of the norm life-cycle. 
  
Norm internalisation may not necessarily and in fact will arguably never achieve collective 
internalisation within the international community of states due to the inevitable political 
undertones of almost any norm that can be analysed through the application of the norm life-
cycle theoretical framework. This suggests that the norm life-cycle is not as inherently linear as 
suggested by the three consecutive stages of the norm life-cycle. Norm internalisation can 
arguably, it is suggested, occur for different states at different times along the spectrum of the 
norm life-cycle in a staggered fashion. The states that are first persuaded by norm 
entrepreneurs to adopt their particular framed issue are those states that may assume the title 
of norm champions in the subsequent stage. This suggests that these states would have to 
internalise the norm so as to effectively socialise other states into adherence to the norm under 
consideration. This state of affairs is particularly necessary within the context of countries with a 
liberal democratic identity. A state may not be able to profess the salience of a norm to other 
states without the approval thereof by numerous national governmental institutions, be it the 
respective country‟s legislature or judiciary or both, especially in relation to norms that require 
the allocation of limited resources away from the domestic citizenry.136 This would in turn 
implicate the necessity of support from the domestic populace particularly in instances where an 
issue of concern enters the international and national dialogue close to a domestic election 
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cycle.137 It is prudent to note here that the domestic citizenry implicates the domestic paradigm 
in relation to international norms, a situation particularly important in the age of modern foreign 
relations and policy where the domestic situation prominent within a country can and does have 
a demonstrable effect on the shape of the foreign relations and policy of a state, a policy which 
may ultimately contribute to the determination of which international norm is to be adopted in the 
first place. The above argument therefore overall suggests that internalisation can perhaps take 
place in a staggered fashion without initial mass convergence by states towards the acceptance 
of the norm as is the case within the third stage of the norm life-cycle laid out by Finnemore and 
Sikkink.138 
 
Cumulatively, the points raised under the heading of norm internalisation suggest that 
internalisation in the vein suggested by the norm life-cycle is somewhat parsimonious and does 
not adequately account for the fickle nature of international politics within which these norms are 
to operate. This critique does not, however, suggest that the current model is wholly inadequate 
and that a radically new alternative conception of internalisation ought to be considered. It 
simply means that greater account ought to be taken of the changing nature of the context 
within which norms operate. 
 
2.4. Norm Death-Series 
 
Scholarship concerning the development of norms has largely focused on the progress of norms 
towards an end point as is illustrated by Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm life-cycle.139 Even norms 
that are entrenched, however, and have acquired the so-called “taken-for-granted” quality 
professed by Finnemore and Sikkink have been challenged in recent years.140 Robert McKeown 
has proposed a model that tracks the decline and possible death of a norm.141 This model is 
constructed along the same basic precepts as the norm life-cycle in that it is comprised of three 
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stages with each stage identified by their respective actors, motivations and mechanisms. It can 









Although the norm death-series suffers from the fate of paucity of scholarship it is nevertheless 
arguably an attractive scholarly endeavour that can, to some degree, account for the regression 
of a norm. One contention of the model is however problematic and it ought to be addressed 
first. 
 
It is maintained by McKeown that the norm death-series only applies to norms that have 
reached the internalisation stage of the norm life-cycle.142 However, many norms do not 
necessarily reach the internalisation stage.143 Norms that fail to reach the final stage and 
therefore fail to acquire the “taken-for-granted” quality ascribed to internalised norms by 
Finnemore and Sikkink can arguably nevertheless be subject to regression. It may be that the 
regression witnessed in as yet “un-internalised” norms could be explained by the insufficient 
number of states that have adopted the norm as a guide to appropriate and therefore legitimate 
behaviour relevant to the issue-area. There are, however, other avenues related to the 
internalisation question that are not as easily cast aside, that is, instances where internalisation 
of a particular norm by a particular state or a grouping of states does not necessarily occur at 
the third stage of the norm life-cycle as is most prominently advanced by Finnemore and 
                                                             
142 McKeown, supra note 44 at 6. 
143 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 43 at 895. 












Sikkink.144 The case of norm leaders that have previously internalised the norms themselves 
into which they have subsequently socialised other states come to mind as discussed in the 
previous section under the third stage of norm internalisation.145 Internalisation in this latter 
instance can, amongst other methods, come on the heels of the institutionalisation of the norm 
in international law instruments such as treaties, or domestic legislation, and thus arguably 
approval by the citizenry through their representatives, that grants approval for expenditure of 
funds where this is relevant.  
 
Another closely associated example to the one immediately above that can be raised, although 
be it in a round-a-bout way, is that of adjacent norms to the one whose development is under 
consideration.146 An illustration of this point can be found in the group of liberal democratic 
states that have internalised human rights norms as part of the very identity of “liberal 
democratic” states147 and its adjacency to refugee protection, a point that will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters. It may be that states who have internalised one norm that serves as a 
foundation to another norm may internalise and come to accept the subsequent norm by virtue 
of their identity before other states have done so on a large enough scale to collectively 
implicate the third stage of the norm life-cycle. The human rights example mentioned is 
particularly apposite since the norm is arguably being peddled to states beyond the core liberal 
democratic group of states so as to expand the reach of democratically-based norms and 
values around the world.  
 
Internalisation therefore arguably, as stated previously in this research, can occur in a 
staggered nature with a particular state‟s stage of internalisation being determined by factors 
such as its position or not as a norm leader and a state‟s inherent characteristics. Regression of 
a norm relevant to particular states (such as those within the liberal democratic paradigm), 
caused by these states‟ own volition, is a cause for concern as it challenges the very 
foundational identity of this grouping. The norm death-series therefore arguably offers a feasible 
model of tracking this regression even in the absence of the level of intensity of internalisation 
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prescribed by the third stage of the norm life-cycle. A further consideration of the norm death-
series is therefore now apposite. 
 
2.4.1. Revisionist Challenge  
 
The first stage of the norm death series is marked by the presence of norm revisionists (or 
agents of norm regression) who undertake the task of reframing the norm concerned and 
presenting a new rationale that facilitates violation of the preceding norm.148 A new standard of 
appropriate behaviour or norm to which a state‟s actions ought to accord is therefore the result. 
This role is reminiscent of the one identified with norm entrepreneurs under the norm life-
cycle.149 McKeown tested his proposed norm death series with the anti-torture norm as example 
and found that the norm was reframed from a humanitarian paradigm towards a security 
paradigm, most prominently after the harrowing events in the United States of America on 11 
September, 2001.150 Reframing of the anti-torture norm has led to its current state of continued 
erosion and the beginning of the ascent of a new, acceptable behaviour that would previously 
not have held much ground under the humanitarian paradigm with its human rights character.151 
It is highly probable that this scenario can feasibly play itself out with other norms at the centre 
of consideration, including the proposed norm of refugee protection that is the focus of this 
research. 
 
The identity of norm revisionists is arguably similar to that of norm entrepreneurs and can 
include entities such as individuals, NGOs, IGOs and states. All these entities have become 
more prominent players on the international stage in recent times, shunning the traditional role 
reserved for states. Once these norm revisionists have revised the content of the norm to a 
sufficiently convincing standard among domestic and international concerns, the challenge 
resonance generated would arguably precipitate the advent of the second stage of the norm 
death series, a reverse cascade.152 
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2.4.2. Reverse Cascade 
 
McKeown posits that the reverse cascade stage is marked by two sub-stages, namely initial 
domestic legitimacy crises within states followed by an international legitimacy crisis.153 This 
concern with legitimacy is echoed within the norm cascade stage of the norm life-cycle.154 
Domestic legitimacy crises in general may refer to the erosion of the normative weight of a norm 
and its consequent ability to demand obedience from persons that ought to operate within its 
confines, that is, the extent of the crisis is such that the norm at hand comes to a critical turning 
point in its continued salience. 155  Similarly, an international legitimacy crisis may refer to the 
instance where a norm‟s ability to demand adherence by a varied band of actors on the 
international stage, including but not limited to states, is at a critical turning point. 156 An 
international legitimacy crisis therefore ensues when the rightfulness of continued adherence or 
the salience of the norm under consideration is questioned.157 
 
The reverse cascade stage is marked by the continued contestation between norm revisionists 
and initial norm entrepreneurs who engage each other over the continued salience of the norm 
in its original format.158 Engagement over the continued salience of the norm may occur within 
public discourse and in the halls of a state‟s Legislature and its Courts.159 If the normative 
debate proffered by norm revisionists gain enough traction within the domestic populace and is 
supported by policy and state rhetoric then a domestic legitimacy crisis is realised.160 An 
international legitimacy crisis may also subsequently ensue if other states-at-large and other 
non-state institutions emulate the contrary action after having borne witness, where this may 
occur, to the diminished or lack of public sanction that accrues to actions that break the 
precepts of the initial norm.161 There may, however, be other entities, particularly non-state 
entities, that continue to acknowledge the legitimacy of the norm under consideration. It could 
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be, however, that the ability of such entities to inflict norm compliance is, however, of 
questionable strength due to the lack of international sanctions against non-compliant states or 
the impotency thereof in relation to the relative strength of domestically-instituted sanctions. 
Furthermore, it may be that later domestic legitimacy crises may draw steam from earlier, 
similar crises in other countries, and would eventually result in a cumulative international 
legitimacy crisis where adherence to the norm is no longer considered necessary by states. 
 
The identity of the states who initially contravene the dictates of the norm and the nature of the 
norm concerned may have substantial bearing on the intensity of damage inflicted upon the 
continued salience of the norm.162 Consideration of an example illustrates this contention. If a 
liberal democratic state were to violate a human rights norm then it would have a considerable 
impact on the continued salience of the norm as opposed to the instance of pariah states that 
may generally violate human rights norms.163 Countries such as China and North Korea in 
context of human rights violations come to mind for the latter point.164 Additionally, if one liberal 
democratic state, especially one with substantial normative weight or perhaps persuasive clout 
were to violate the precepts of a human rights norm then it is highly likely that other states that 
ascribe to the liberal democratic identity would perpetrate the same violation thereby pushing 
the existence of the norm to the brink of extinction.165 This possibility connects with the concept 
of specially affected states and the argument laid out in the section concerned with the norm 
life-cycle in relation to the quality as opposed to the quantity of states that are required to bring 
about a norm cascade. The realisation of an international legitimacy crisis and a concomitant 
reverse cascade as such can therefore lead into the final stage of the norm death-series, that is, 
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2.4.3. Norm Expiration 
 
The final stage of the norm death series is concerned with the expiration of the norm through 
sustained challenge as to the norm‟s continued salience, both in the domestic and international 
realms.166 In this stage the foundation has been laid for the normalisation of the action taken to 
violate the initial norm.167 It is possible that a new norm can therefore be said to emerge from 
the ashes. The emergence of a new norm is, however, only arguably viable if the initial norm did 
not simply erode to a prior state of incarnation. An alternative norm should exist to take its 
place.168 This latter point as it pertains to what can be called back-tracking of the norm is 
somewhat dubious and requires further consideration. 
 
It can be deduced from McKeown‟s suggestions that if a norm were to erode to a prior state of 
existence then it would fail to precipitate the formation of a new norm.169 This argument can be 
refuted if one considers the nature of the international political arena over time by means of an 
example norm. Fitzsimmons considers in his article the formation and eventual decay of the 
norm against the use of mercenary armies in the service of states.170 He rightly states that in his 
book, The Prince,171 Machiavelli spoke out against the use of such armies as their loyalty could 
not be trusted. This theme has echoed throughout the world for many years, yet a reversion to 
the use of mercenary armies in the form of private security contractors in the continuing conflict 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq has since materialised.172 The emergence of the norm of using 
mercenary armies is not necessarily a reversion on the same spectrum as the norm existed 
before and during Machiavelli‟s time. The international system of states is not static. The 
fundamental players and the distribution of power have since changed exponentially. The 
influence of globalisation and the concomitant spread of human rights centred-regimes have 
also crafted a world different from the one in which mercenary armies were common place.  
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The logic of the above argument suggests that a new norm can develop along the model 
provided by the norm life-cycle after the expiration of the norm under the circumstances 
suggested by the norm death-series and not simply back-track to a prior incarnation thereof 
even though the new norm may be similar in nature to a previously existing norm. This is 
possible since the context of a norm‟s existence can arguably never be duplicated exactly as it 
existed in a previous era. It is also pertinent to mention that the factors prominent in the erosion 
of the initial norm may arguably feed into the formation of a new norm, that is, arguments raised 




This chapter has considered both the theoretical model of the norm life-cycle presented by 
Finnemore and Sikkink and McKeown‟s proposed theoretical model of the norm death-series.  
Cumulatively, this chapter also exposed both models to some critical considerations. 
Nevertheless, the norm life-cycle model, taking due cognisance of some criticisms perhaps, will 
be employed in chapter 3 so as to consider the development of a norm of refugee protection. 
Chapter 4 will consider the erosion of the norm of refugee protection whose existence is 
proposed in chapter 3. The implications of the erosion will also be considered in context of 






















DEVELOPMENT OF A NORM OF REFUGEE PROTECTION? 
3.1. Overview 
 
A discussion of the substantive factors surrounding refugee protection is first necessary to 
facilitate the application of the stages of the norm life-cycle, the theoretical framework presented 
in the first part of chapter 2 of this research. The application section of this chapter will then 
subsequently present a contention that refugee protection did indeed crystallise into a norm 
within the framework of the Constructivist-based norm life-cycle, criticism of the norm-cycle as 
raised in chapter 2 notwithstanding. 
 
This chapter will therefore first seek show the gradual development of an initial norm of refugee 
protection around the time when the 1951 Refugee Convention came into force on 22 April 1954 
and the subsequent 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention which came into effect on 4 
October 1967.173 The development of this purported initial norm will be considered within the 
human rights context surrounding the initial motivation behind the adoption of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. This human rights infusion is supported by the multitude of other international and 
regional-based legal instruments which have come to fruition in particular since the adoption of 
the UDHR.174  
 
The second part of this chapter will superimpose the stages of Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm 
life-cycle on the immediately preceding substantive overview.175 It will become clear that the 
norm emergence and norm cascade stages are realised whereas the norm internalisation stage 
is arguably, but not conclusively, realised within the context proffered by the third stage of the 
norm life-cycle. 
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3.2. A Brief History of Refugees   
 
The movement of people from place to place is not an uncommon phenomenon in the annals of 
history. 176 The large-scale migration of people has been necessitated by numerous causes 
including intentional violence prompted by human intolerance and harsh environmental realities. 
People that fell subject to these realities were and still are understood to be displaced persons 
or more accurately “refugees” as they are not able to remain within their original place of 
habitation and had to seek refuge elsewhere. The use of the term “refugee”, first thought to 
have been used around 1685,177 has however gradually been circumscribed to a finite category 
of displaced people within the official parlance of international relations and international law 
with the imposition of more formalised regimes concerned with the plight of refugees.178  
 
These formalised regimes came into existence in the 1900s with prior times marked by large-
scale migration of people across the world. The United States of America in particular attracted 
dissident Europeans in the 1700 and 1800s, a fact commemorated by the Statue of Liberty 
situated in New York and the words that have become synonymous with the search for freedom 
by these European dissidents: “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to 
breathe free”.179 The 1900s marked the ascent of aversion to a free-for-all migration of people, 
whether voluntarily or forcibly, across international borders.180 Numerous bodies concerned with 
the refugee question were therefore established to address the concerns of affected states, 
particularly receiving or host states.  
 
The High Commission for Refugees was set up in 1921 under the auspices of the League of 
Nations with the Norwegian, Fridthof Nansen as its High Commissioner.181 The High 
Commission for Refugees was afforded the mandate to deal with Russian refugees emanating 
from the Russian Revolution and the effects of the First World War (the Great War) and 
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subsequent Armenian refugees.182 The High Commission‟s limited mandate reflects similar 
subsequent trends. The High Commission was followed in existence by bodies such as the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) that was in operation from its 
establishment on 9 November 1943 until 1947 when UNRRA‟s mandate expired,183 and the 
International Refugee Organisation (IRO) was set up as a temporary specialised agency of the 
United Nations from 1946 to 1952.184The initial efforts by states to institutionalise operational 
responses to the plight of refugees culminated in the establishment of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which became operational on 1 January 
1951.185 The UNHCR‟s mission was, and still is, informed by the provisions of the Statute of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees186 and the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.187 Some of the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, however, were 
subsequently neutered by the passage of the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
that is, the 1967 Protocol saw the removal of the temporal and geographic limitation attached to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention.188 The 1951 Refugee Convention was initially only applicable to 
refugees “created” before 1 January 1951 who were outside the borders of their respective 
states within Europe.189 This does not, however, mean that a refugee problem as such was non-
existent in other parts of the world outside Europe.190 
 
3.3. The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol  
 
The 1951 Refugee Convention was most poignantly a response to the horrific events that 
occurred during the Second World War, particularly as they pertain to the plight of European 
Jews and the nomadic Roma people who sought to escape the persecution visited on them by 
the Nazi regime that existed in Germany in the years leading up to and during the Second World 
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War.191 These groups of people, amongst others, generally sought to escape the growing 
inhospitable conditions marked most generally by racial and religious intolerance within their 
respective countries of origin by travelling to safer neighbouring countries or to the borders of 
countries further removed and outside Europe and subsequently seeking protection from these 
countries. These people were, in particular the German Jews aboard the St. Louis, largely 
refused assistance in the form of protection against persecution and were sent back to their 
countries of origin to face an uncertain future.192 An overwhelming majority of these people most 
likely perished in the ghettos and concentration camps, especially in Germany and Poland that 
became synonymous with the Nazi regime during the Second World War.193 What is now a clear 
and apparent violation of human rights was not as pertinent and present in discourse at the 
time. These and other numerous atrocities witnessed immediately prior to and during the 
Second World War from 1939 - 1945 prompted a renewed fervour for human rights reminiscent 
of the collection of rights propagated around the time of the French Revolution in 1789 in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.194 
 
The UDHR passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, became 
the first international legal instrument to recognise the universal human rights attributable to all 
persons by virtue of their humanity.195 The provisions of the UDHR have arguably become 
entrenched in customary international law.196 This newly-established focus on human rights was 
arguably bound to affect, if not only partially but significantly, the content of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. The human rights character of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and by extension the 
1967 Protocol, have been widely acknowledged, in particular by Sadako Ogata, the UNHCR for 
the period 1991 – 2001.197 In fact, the Preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention references the 
import of the UDHR.198 To date the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol have been 
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signed, ratified or acceded to by over 140 states each. Currently, the 1951 Refugee Convention 
has 145 States Parties and the 1967 Protocol has 146 States Parties.199  
 
The provisions of both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol provide key 
mechanisms that recognise the plight of a specific category of displaced persons under the term 
“refugee”. These provisions are aimed at providing the requisite protection to persons who 
qualify as refugees under the provisions of Article 1A of the 1951 Refugee Convention.200 These 
rights are in addition to those afforded to refugees by virtue of their identity as human beings 
through instruments such as the UDHR and any additional rights granted to de facto refugees or 
asylum-seekers by contracting parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
thereto enunciated within these respective international legal instruments.201  
 
The humanitarian context of the 1951 Refugee Convention notwithstanding, the advent of the 
Cold War period after the conclusion of the Second World War arguably also coloured the 
context of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the motivation for action by states party to the 
1951 Refugee Convention. It has been argued that the admission of refugees from the 
Communist, Soviet Union by the Western, capitalist-oriented world was deemed a political 
victory.202 The period after the Cold War also brought about demonstrable effects in terms of 
adherence to and proper application of the provisions of both the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol thereto.203 
 
3.4. Refugee Protection 
 
Refugee protection is a composite term whose meaning can be extrapolated from numerous 
provisions such as non-refoulement and asylum contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol thereto. Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
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thereto considers the situation of a person who is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of 
the protection of their respective state of origin and consequently flees its jurisdiction in search 
of such protection elsewhere. Such protection can be deemed to exist particularly through the 
provisions of non-refoulement and the granting of asylum. The principle of non-refoulement as 
encapsulated in Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the attached status of 




Asylum as it pertains to refugee law refers to the granting by a host state of a particular status to 
persons seeking protection from persecution.204 Once the ascription of this status to a person is 
realised, it requires that a host state uphold certain rights afforded to such a person who has 
been granted asylum under the relevant instruments, that is, the host state should protect the 
concerned individual from persecution and other forms of exploitation.205 There are also certain 
duties placed upon persons who have received asylum.206 
 
There is no direct ascription of a right to asylum in the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 
Protocol thereto.207 By virtue of Article 5 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, states party to the 
1951 Refugee Convention and by virtue of Article 1(1) of the 1967 Protocol, states party to the 
1967 Protocol, may not impair the rights afforded to refugees by virtue of the contracting state‟s 
enjoinment to any other Convention or international legal instrument.208 This possibly allows for 
the importation of Article 14(1) of the UDHR which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to 
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”209 This provision is arguably not 
meant to be read as a right to be granted asylum, however. It is rather suggested to mean the 
enshrinement of the right of persons to seek and apply for asylum, free from pernicious 
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government prevention of achieving this goal, and where it is granted it should be allowed in full 
without subsequent curtailment without justification.  
 
This discussion of asylum and its invocation by asylum-seekers is important for the argument 
laid out in chapter 4 of this research pertaining to the practice of states in relation to the 
development of a new norm of refugee protection which is in contention with the norm of 




The principle of non-refoulement is an international law mechanism that prohibits host states 
from returning asylum seekers and refugees to their country of origin if they have a well-founded 
fear of persecution if they were to return.210 This principle is not, however, unique to the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,  factor that speaks to its broad-based 
salience.211 Examples of other instruments include the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.212 Non-refoulement is also considered 
to be a part of customary international law and no reservation can be entered against its 
applicability in terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention.213 
 
The principle of non-refoulement as contained in Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
provides that: 
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“No Contracting State shall expel or return…a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 
 
A cursory reading of the provision makes it clear that states are not allowed to return any 
persons who qualify as a refugee under the requisite provisions of Article 1(A) of the 1951 
Refugee Convention to their state of origin or any other state where they will be subject to any 
form of persecution, including but not limited to cruel and inhuman treatment. This provision is 
further supplemented by Article 1(A) which considers a well-founded fear of persecution as 
opposed to the actual occurrence of persecution as grounds for the recognition of refugee 
status. This could therefore facilitate a reading of Article 33(1) to include a well-founded fear and 
not only actual occurrence of threat to a person‟s life or freedom for the listed categories. 
 
There has been some discontent as to the exact meaning attributable to Article 33(1).214 A more 
in-depth consideration of the contents of the principle of non-refoulement is therefore in order 
also for the additional purpose to lay bare, in chapter 4 of this research, subsequent state 
practice that is inconsistent with the provisions of the principle of non-refoulement.  This will 
assist in the application of the norm life-cycle and the norm death-series to track the evolution of 
the norm of refugee protection, the initial incarnation of the norm which is propagated in this 
chapter. 
 
The UNHCR has advanced the contention in its procedural guide that a refugee as referred to in 
Article 33(1) refers to both those persons who have officially been accorded refugee status and 
those who have applied to the requisite authorities to be recognised as such.215 The latter group 
is more commonly known as asylum-seekers. This inclusive interpretation of who is termed a 
refugee in terms of the Article 33(1) provision prevents a legal absurdity from arising in that if 
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the provision where to be interpreted to refer only to those persons who already enjoy official 
recognition, a state‟s authorities could arguably arbitrarily remove persons who have not yet 
been afforded the official refugee label from their territory, even in the event that they have 
applied for a hearing to determine their refugee status. This generous, inclusive interpretation 
therefore is preferable and is commensurate with recognition of official refugee status merely 
being of a declaratory as opposed to a constitutive nature.216 This means that if a person who is 
fleeing persecution fulfills the criteria of a refugee before being officially recognised as such they 
are able to be afforded the label of refugee, albeit de facto, and should arguably therefore also 
fall subject to the non-refoulement principle enunciated therein.  
 
An additional contentious point of interpretation lies with the territoriality of the provision of non-
refoulement. An ordinary-meaning interpretation, as enjoined by Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),217 lends credence to the interpretation that the 
operation of the principle of non-refoulement is limited in application to persons who are present 
on the territory of the state concerned, that is, the state from whom these persons seek asylum. 
This is commensurate with the interpretation provided by the United States Supreme Court in 
the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.218  
 
An advisory opinion commissioned by the Geneva-based UNHCR in 2007, however, has 
advanced an alternate interpretation of extra-territoriality in line with the objects, purpose and 
spirit advanced by the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol in conjunction with its 
human rights supporting base.219 This interpretation advances the contention that Article 33(1) 
applies to persons not yet present on the territory of the state concerned but who is rather 
subject to the effective control or authority of the particular state.220 Effective control is not 
concisely defined in this advisory opinion or elsewhere but it is maintained that it is not 
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necessarily limited to a state‟s territory but may operate extra-territorially.221 It is suggested that 
effective control in an extra-territorial manner can therefore plausibly proceed in places such as 
the frontier of a state and the high seas. The nature of effective control particularly in pursuit of 
interdiction at sea, it is suggested, logically extends to circumstances where the state who is 
seeking to interdict approaching vessels, control the movements of these vessels and 
sometimes board them. This latter contention is borne out by state practice, itself an important 
source of international law and consequent concepts such as that of effective control.222 
 
If this extra-territorial application of non-refoulement were not the intention of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto then the Convention would essentially not remedy 
instances such as those that occurred during the initial stages of the Second World War where 
Jewish persons were actively denied access to foreign territory to claim asylum but were rather 
sent back to Nazi Germany.223 It would, as argued by the advisory opinion, also be stated in the 
text if the provision were to operate only within the territory of a state.224 Furthermore, the 
provision of territoriality is also not a prerequisite for other incarnations of non-refoulement as 
contained in other international instruments.225  
 
The importance of the divergent interpretations of this territoriality provision will become clear in 
chapter 4 in conjunction with state practice and the question of whether the contours of a new 
norm of refugee protection is identifiable subsequent to the initial norm of refugee protection 
whose existence is being advanced in this chapter. 
 
The principle of non-refoulement is not absolute, however, as its operation can be curtailed by 
the instances outlined in Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, that is: 
“The benefit of [Article 33(1)] may not…be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he 
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is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”226  
 
Overall, the principle of non-refoulement is central to the provision of refugee protection. Any 
violation therefore by states party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and / or the 1967 Protocol 
thereto constitutes a disregard for the protection of refugees and the motivation and purpose 
behind the original adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  
 
3.5. Application of the Norm Life-Cycle 
 
The background consideration laid out in the preceding sections of this chapter will now be used 
as a template to which the norm life-cycle theoretical framework, the provisions of which have 
been laid out in chapter 2 of this research, will be applied. The intention is to identify an initial 
norm of refugee protection thereby seemingly proving the truth of the corresponding hypothesis 
advanced in the introductory chapter of this research paper 
 
3.5.1. Norm Emergence 
 
The level of appropriate behaviour attached to the treatment of refugees and the responsibility 
attendant on the international community came to the fore during the aftermath of the Second 
World War under the auspices of concerned states and other entities who participated in the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1950 where they were charged with drafting the 1951 
Refugee Convention.227 The prevailing pro-human rights atmosphere of the time and the 
success of norm entrepreneurs in that paradigm, norm entrepreneurs such as Eleanor 
Roosevelt who played an important role in advocating for the rights contained in the UDHR, 
arguably also influenced the receptiveness for the establishment of a permanent international 
refugee regime informed by those rights enunciated in the UDHR.228 
                                                             
226 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(2). 
227 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1. 












Collectively, these people and entities arguably came to embody the role of norm entrepreneurs 
as they began to frame the issues prominent to the refugee paradigm in terms of newly minted 
human rights discourse.229 Since its formal inception in 1945, the United Nations became the 
organisational platform through which norm entrepreneurs of numerous norms came to work, 
peddling the acceptance of norms that comport with the values of peace, security and respect 
for human rights contained in the United Nations Charter.230 The United Nations was indeed 
able to supply a far-reaching channel of communication and a common ground in the ideological 
divided world of the Cold War era. The United Nations can in fact still be said to fulfill such a role 
today even though it has been somewhat diluted in recent years.  
 
The norm entrepreneurs involved in the framing of what later became the international refugee 
regime arguably succeeded in persuading enough states, or a critical mass of states, of the 
salience and necessity of addressing the refugee question to ensure the achievement of a 
subsequent tipping point, the realisation of which would, and in fact did, facilitate the occurrence 
of a norm cascade.  The identity of these states could arguably be those Western European 
nations who adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention early on, not surprisingly since the initial 
application of the 1951 Refugee Convention was largely limited to that geographical area.231  
 
The overall success of the norm entrepreneurs are, however, open to debate due to the limited 
number of states that participated in the Conference of Plenipotentiaries and who were charged 
with drafting what eventually became the 1951 Refugee Convention. In all, only 26 states 
actively participated in the Conference with the majority of those states situated in Western-
Europe.232 The states of Iran and Cuba only enjoyed observer status and the state of 
Yugoslavia was the only communist-leaning state in Europe present at the Conference. The 
limited participation of states, however, can be said to be of little consequence in this instance 
as the 1951 Refugee Convention was eventually adopted in some form, either by initial 
signature and ratification, or accession by numerous states within Europe during the 1950s and 
a large contingent of African and Latin American states by the time the 1967 Protocol was 
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adopted.233 The temporal and geographical limitations attached to the operation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention was therefore arguably not a severe obstacle for the acceptance of the 
standards laid out in the 1951 Refugee Convention as the acceptable standard of behaviour in 
the case of refugees, both officially recognised and those operating under a prima facie refugee 
status. Furthermore, subsequent to the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, the provisions laid forth 
by the 1951 Refugee Convention almost wholly found their way into regional legal instruments, 
most prominently the 1969 OAU Convention in Africa,234  and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration in 
Latin America.235  
  
The identity of the states who initially contributed to the establishment of the international 
refugee law regime was largely democratic. These states were mostly centred in Western 
Europe at the time and consequently the ones most directly affected by the fallout of the human 
displacement caused by the atrocities of the Second World War. This point is of great 
importance in this instance as adherence to and most often the export of human rights practices 
is considered a fundamental part of the democratic state identity,236 something that is of 
particular relevance in this instance in light of the intimate connection between refugee law, 
including refugee protection, and human rights. This fact also contributes to the anointment of 
norm leaders in relation to the norm cascade stage which will be considered subsequently. 
 
It must be noted, however, that the United States did not become a contracting party to the 
1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol until 1968 when the United States ratified the 
1967 Protocol.237 The United States had previously operated under a system sometimes at odds 
with the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention even, when in reality, the United States 
accepted large amounts of people as refugees following the end of the Second World War.238 At 
one point, the United States only recognised refugees emanating from Communist countries 
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and countries situated in the Middle East.239 The United States was eventually prompted to 
accede to the 1967 Protocol and thus ascribe to the precepts of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
arguably by the moral pressure emanating from various human rights groups, as well as 
discontent from a section of the United States Legislative Branch, the United States Congress, 
due to the executive-led domestic refugee regime up to that point in time.240 The United States, 
however, only came to pass domestic legislation to echo the definition of refugee as contained 
in the 1967 Protocol in 1980 with the Refugee Act.241 
 
Whether the United States as a modern, liberal democratic scion can therefore be considered to 
have been persuaded to adopt the 1967 Protocol by norm entrepreneurs along the underlying 
motivations of altruism, empathy  and ideological conviction indicative of the norm emergence 
stage of the norm life-cycle or rather have been socialised into its paradigm for purposes of 
maintaining its legitimacy, reputation and esteem in line with the motivations backing the norm 
cascade stage is therefore a debatable point.242 While norm entrepreneurs were arguably not 
inconsequential in their efforts to persuade the United States  to adopt the norm of refugee 
protection as witnessed by the eventual adoption by the United States of the 1967 Protocol, it is 
equally possible that eventual US capitulation pursued reasons or motivating factors found in 
the norm cascade stage, that is, to retain or in fact recover some legitimacy both internationally 
and domestically, and consequently reinforce its reputation of a liberal democratic state who 
advocates adherence to and respect for human rights both at home and abroad.243 The case of 
the United States is therefore a borderline case between the norm emergence and cascade 
stages. 
 
The underlying motivation of the United States‟ adoption notwithstanding, the norm life-cycle 
posits that the motive behind adherence to the norm peddled by norm entrepreneurs in this 
initial stage of norm emergence includes that of altruism and empathy.244 Whether altruism is or 
can ever be an identifiable motivation behind the adoption of the norm is, however, questionable 
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partially due to the inherent political nature of the subject matter contained within the refugee 
paradigm or even the global political arena-at-large and the inherently selfish nature of states.  
 
These arguments notwithstanding, altruism as a motivating factor is arguably nevertheless a 
viable and evident avenue to consider in this context and time period since states, particularly 
those who were subjected to the aggression of the Axis powers, were arguably encouraged by 
the reigning optimistic human rights environment prevalent in the period immediately following 
the end of the Second World War to alleviate the suffering of people, if only initially within the 
confines of European boundaries. This reference to altruism can also be raised as a supporting 
argument for the presence of empathy amongst states who suffered at the hands of Axis 
powers‟ aggression, through occupation of their territory and the eradication of vast numbers of 
its citizens either on the battlefield or through the concentration camps erected by the Nazi 
regime throughout central and eastern Europe during the Second World War.245 
 
In preliminary conclusion with regards to the norm emergence stage of the norm life-cycle, a 
norm of refugee protection, as evidenced by the focus on the principles of non-refoulement and 
asylum, arose after the end of the Second World War by the efforts of concerned organisations, 
states and people in their roles as norm entrepreneurs. This norm was adopted by a number of 
critical states in terms of their democratic identity, particularly within Europe itself.246 These 
European states were also the central focus of the 1951 Refugee Convention‟s provisions. The 
geographical and temporal limitation enunciated earlier did also not overtly prevent states to 
which the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention did not apply from acceding to the 1951 
Refugee Convention in its limited guise. This state of affairs arguably brought about both a 
critical mass of states and an ultimate tipping point, perhaps in terms of quality, that are both 
essential events to facilitate the initiation of a norm cascade.247  
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3.5.2. Norm Cascade 
 
The presence of a tentative norm of refugee protection as initially shaped by norm 
entrepreneurs and other concerned entities and its initial acceptance by states arguably 
facilitated the crystallisation and adoption of the norm concerned. The increasing frequency of 
adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention and / or the 1967 Protocol thereto arguably also 
therefore bears witness to the increasing acceptance of the norm of refugee protection. The 
1951 Refugee Convention is after all not entitled to its claimed substance without the 
concomitant acceptance of the norm of refugee protection, the non-refoulement component of 
which cannot enjoin a reservation against its operation.248 
 
As has been noted earlier in this chapter, the role of norm leader in the current instance is 
centred primarily on those states that have as part of their underlying identity as democratic 
states the inherent acceptance of human rights standards as a guide to appropriate behaviour. 
These states include those in Europe, particularly in Western Europe, and other liberal 
democratic states such as Australia and Canada. The caveat applicable to the United States as 
a potential norm leader is addressed elsewhere. These states were also, although perhaps not 
still today, relatively powerful in terms of both hard and soft power at the time of the formation of 
the norm of refugee protection and therefore could also carry a substantial amount of 
persuasive power to convince states of the salience of allowing themselves to be socialised or 
more precisely to change their behaviour to the standard that comports with that “preferred by 
the international society of states”.249  
 
These norm leaders arguably began to facilitate a process of socialisation exerted upon other 
yet non-compliant states. This is borne out by, as mentioned earlier, the increased frequency of 
ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention particularly after the 1967 Protocol thereto removed 
the geographical and temporal restrictions imposed on the operation of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.250 The acceptance of the norm of refugee protection, although an international 
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norm, is also supported by the advent and acceptance of regional instruments such as the 1969 
OAU Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration.251  
 
The reasons underlying the increased frequency of adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention at 
least, are conceivably numerous. Although speculative, it may not be far off to consider that 
newly decolonised states in Africa, in particular, may have been persuaded  or subtly coerced to 
adopt the 1951 Refugee Convention or may have emulated norm leaders‟ adoption thereof. The 
motivation either way could lie in their need for acceptance as serious contenders on the global 
stage, even as newly formed states.  Additionally, and this could apply to all states, the 
consideration of asserting at least some level of sanctioned control on the movement of 
displaced persons could have played a role. Overall, the reasons for adoption of at least the 
1951 Refugee Convention can perhaps be seen as a rationalist calculation of cost and benefit, 
thereby not fully subscribing to a logic of appropriateness but rather a mid-way compromise 
suggested by rational-constructivism. 
 
Given all of the above,  it is not overall possible to definitively impose exact dates and times on 
the norm cascade of the norm of refugee protection advanced in this chapter, It is nonetheless 
evident from the information considered above in context of the norm life-cycle that the requisite 
norm leaders were present during this second stage of the norm life-cycle to facilitate the 
socialisation, either proactively or indirectly through emulation, persuasion or coercion and 
result in the ultimate achievement of norm cascade towards the latter part of the scale proposed 
by Finnemore and Sikkink. Internalisation as the final stage of the norm life-cycle will be 
considered in the section that follows. 
 
3.5.3. Norm Internalisation 
 
The realisation of norm internalisation in line with the definition thereof set out in chapter 2 of 
this research is arguable. If the hallmark of this stage is the so-called taken-for-granted quality 
of the norm under consideration in that the salience of the norm is no longer questioned but 
                                                             












merely accepted as a given, then the norm of refugee protection may run into a degree of 
trouble. Cumulatively, the sheer number of states who have, however, become party to 
international legal instruments, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and / or the 1967 
Protocol thereto252 and additional regional instruments, and the conceivable underlying reasons 
therefor may counteract the concern about the perceived absence of the taken-for-granted 
quality of the norm of refugee protection.  However, the norm life-cycle does not clearly state 
how many states ought to adhere to the norm in this manner so as to constitute 
internationalisation. It is unhelpful to suggest that every state should comply with a norm so as 
to generate norm internalisation as the nature of world politics is simply too contentious for 
everyone to agree. Rather, the nature of a state and the nature of the norm may determine 
whether adherence by a state is relevant or not. The norm of refugee protection and adherence 
of human rights-revering states are therefore more apposite to consider here as opposed to 
those pariah states that generally violate such tenets based on human rights. 
 
The fact that the refugee regime is also, as mentioned, closely adjacent to the human rights 
regime, arguably an internalised regime, is apposite to consider in arguing for norm 
internalisation. If the human rights connection were not pertinent then internalisation of this 
norm of refugee protection may never have been realised, even in a tenuous way. Furthermore, 
the fact that most human rights norms and indeed also the principle of non-refoulement are 
considered to be part of customary international law due to the intensity and longevity of state 
practice in this field and the belief by many that such standards of behaviour are legally binding, 
can arguably further contribute to solidifying the argument in support of norm internalisation of 
refugee protection.  
 
Overall, the truth is that the nature of the refugee protection norm under consideration here will 
frequently generate contestation since it concerns itself with contentious matters such as costs 
incurred by host states on non-citizens, costs that emanate from a pool of limited resources. 
This particular instance will most certainly attract domestic discontent and would perhaps 
necessitate the application of two-level game schematics to find an appropriate solution to the 
                                                             












conundrum posed.253 That said, however, it must be remembered that the norm under 
consideration here is an international one and that internal discontent within a state may not 
always win the day especially in a dictatorship but also in a democracy where dissent may be in 
the minority. Similarly, the international nature of the norm and the taken-for-granted quality of 
internalised norms may not require genuine intent for internalisation to occur, that is, paying lip 
service to the norm may also be sufficient since it is not entirely clear in the norm life-cycle 
framework whether it should be otherwise. Internal discontent may therefore not even matter. 





This chapter has attempted to prove the existence of a norm of refugee protection in its initial 
incarnation emanating from the principle of non-refoulement contained in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the related status of asylum. The existence of this norm has been argued at the 
hand of the three stages of the norm life-cycle proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink. Norm 
emergence and cascade have arguably been realised. The realisation of norm internalisation is 
more contentious, however, since it is unclear how many states‟ adherence constitutes 
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REGRESSION OF THE NORM OF REFUGEE PROTECTION? 
 
4.1. Overview  
 
Chapter 3 advanced the contention that a norm of refugee protection developed from within the 
refugee protection framework that was set up under the auspices of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the 1967 Protocol thereto and other related human rights treaties and declarations. 
It was also stated that the norm of refugee protection is regarded as the core of the international 
refugee regime with the principle of non-refoulement being considered as the minimum core 
content of refugee protection.254 Asylum, although not an explicit right afforded in any 
international legal instrument, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
thereto, except for Article 14(1) of the UDHR, is also part of the core of refugee protection.255 
Furthermore, once asylum is granted to a person, s/he hence becomes an officially recognised 
refugee under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention. A set of rights enunciated within the 
parameters of the 1951 Refugee Convention is afforded to the refugee as such, notwithstanding 
the earlier consideration of de facto refugees.256 Whether these rights are realised by states 
under their obligations arising from the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, however, 
remains uncertain. State practice and state rhetoric may and often deviates from a common 
purpose. International agreements may, furthermore, often be concluded and endorsed by 
certain key states simply to pander to critics.257  
 
A further element that is closely connected to the principle of asylum is that of attaining a long-
term solution to the plight of a refugee. These solutions include voluntary repatriation to their 
country of origin, local integration or resettlement to a third country.258 Each of these solutions, 
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ideally, provides a new life to refugees, free from persecution such as that mentioned in this 
chapter. A consideration of these solutions, although mentioned briefly, is however beyond the 
scope of this enquiry. 
 
Given this layout of the content of refugee protection in terms of non-refoulement and asylum 
and proposed solutions to the refugee protection problem, it is arguable that a norm of refugee 
protection originally arose from within the framework proffered by the 1951 Refugee Convention 
as supported by other international human rights treaties, declarations, regional agreements 
and domestic empowering legislation. This norm has, however, come under doubt due to the 
contrary state practice exhibited by states in their sometimes limited adherence to the principles 
that inform the content of the norm of refugee protection. States have variedly even undertaken 
practices that are aimed at deterring persons who may genuinely qualify as Convention 
refugees from seeking entry into their country. These deterrence practices point towards an 
underlying larger strategy of state evasion whereby states seek to evade the obligations 
imposed upon them by virtue of their acceptance of the 1951 Refugee Convention, other related 
legal instruments and in the case of the principle of non-refoulement, their membership in the 
international community of states due to the arguably customary law status of that specific 
principle.259 These evasive strategies extend beyond blatant disregard for the principle of non-
refoulement to questionable asylum determination procedures and longer-term solutions to the 
refugee problem. Consideration of the latter two instances is, however, beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
The propensity of states to engage in these evasive strategies is informed by, amongst a 
greater list of reasons, the heavy cost burden imposed on states in the event of refugees 
reaching their shores, the protracted nature of the refugee problem, the possibility of disrupting 
the existing social fabric which may be adverse to multicultural tolerance (as witnessed by bouts 
of xenophobia in countries around the world in recent years and declarations by prominent 
                                                             












European leaders with respect to the failure in their respective countries),260 and finally the 
security concerns of countries particularly in a post 9/11 world.261  
 
Given the underlying presence of these evasive strategies, this chapter will advance the notion 
that the norm of refugee protection has come under challenge from the practice of states. The 
chapter will first look at general instances of state practice, focusing particularly on mechanisms 
of deterrence. The chapter will then consider the state practice of two states, namely Australia 
and the United States. 262 These states provide particularly poignant case studies due to their 
liberal democratic identity that considers human rights as a central concept, yet their practice 
has shown their active intent to decouple their obligations arising under the international refugee 
law regime from its human rights foundations, the very foundations of a liberal democratic 
identity.263 In addition, these countries‟ particular instances of state practice have proven to be 
creative and unique in many ways. 
 
The chapter will then proceed to a consideration of the information offered in the first half of this 
chapter through the lens of theory. The norm death-series theoretical framework with its three 
stages of operation, namely that of the revisionist challenge, reverse cascade and norm 
expiration, will first be considered and it will be advanced that the original norm of refugee 
protection can be placed within the throes of the latter part of the norm death-series. A 
subsequent consideration will then be had in terms of a new norm of refugee protection in light 
of a second application of the norm life-cycle theoretical framework. It will then be argued in 
conclusion that a new norm of refugee protection is thus emerging.  
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4.2. General Instances of State Practice  
 
As has been stated in the previous chapters of this research, the refugee protection system 
entails the expenditure of sometimes substantial resources by states on non-citizens.264 This 
expenditure of limited resources, the prospect of no end in sight to the refugee problem as of yet 
and security concerns related to the presence of refugees within a host state‟s jurisdiction has 
increased the prevalence of evasive strategies implemented by states to avoid incurring 
additional burdens beyond that generated by its pre-existing domestic commitments. In 
particular, states have sought to engage in practices to deter refugees from even attempting to 
seek asylum from them. A closer consideration of these deterrence mechanism reveals 
numerous examples, including the institution of visa requirements, carries sanctions, adherence 
to the notion of “safe” countries of origin, the declaration of so-called “international zones”, pre-
screening in the event of foreign territory departures and questionable detention of persons 
seeking asylum. These various incarnations of deterrence mechanisms will now each be 
considered briefly with the exception of detention, which will be considered in the subsequent 
section of Australian practice. 
 
4.2.1. Visa Requirements 
 
Countries generally require that all foreigners seeking entry into their territory be in the 
possession of a valid visa and other related travel documents such as a legally-recognised 
passport issued by the bearer‟s country of citizenship.265 The flight of refugees from situations of 
persecution often, however, prevents them from obtaining the necessary travel documentation 
especially in the event where a government actively pursues a programme of protracted 
violence against its own citizens and would therefore be highly reticent to grant official 
documentation to citizens it may deem as “terrorists” as is the official government terminology 
                                                             
264 Chimni, supra note 136. 
265 James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection” (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
115 at 120 [Hathaway & Neve]; Arthur C. Helton, The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian 
Action in the New Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 163 [Helton]; Kjaerum, supra 












used by the Syrian government.266 It is logical to conclude from this that refugees would 
therefore either travel without any travel documentation or seek entrance into a country of 
asylum with the use of fraudulent travel documentation, all in the bid to escape persecution. 
Additionally, refugees are in theory exempt from the institution of penalties, provided certain 
conditions are met, on such instances of illegality by virtue of Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.267 The presence of this provision and the official, rhetorical adherence to the 1951 
Refugee Convention has not, however, deterred some states from imposing penalties on often 
legitimate refugees who enter a country with fraudulent documents.268  
 
4.2.2. Carrier Sanctions 
 
States have begun to impose penalties on airlines and shipping companies, amongst others, if 
they are found to be transporting persons whom do not hold in their possession the requisite 
travel documents such as valid passports and visas where they are so required.269 It is 
legitimately arguable that sanctions of this type are aimed at deterring complicity in committing 
the exploitative crime of human trafficking.270 The non-discerning nature of the application of this 
strategy can and most probably has, however, caught legitimate refugees within its net. It is 
arguable, but not unlikely, that states have intentionally crafted the strategy in this manner, that 
is, they are aware that legitimate refugees may be caught in the net of the prohibition but that 
this would prevent a possible host state having to expend any further resources on unwanted 
individuals in the event that they are able to gain access to the state. This practice, therefore, 
arguably utilises legitimate purpose in the guise of preventing human trafficking to disguise a 
questionable practice of preventing legitimate refugees from accessing the protection that they 
are in dire need of and under international law are entitled to claim. 
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4.2.3. Safe Countries of Origin 
 
It is evident that the political conditions (and geographic conditions if “environmental refugees” 
are considered) prevalent in some countries are more prone to “creating” refugees than the 
conditions in other countries. Some countries have taken this concept to the extreme and have 
declared that particular states are unable to produce refugees that is, these countries are 
assumed to not fall into the disarray that is commensurate with known refugee-producing 
countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Afghanistan and Iraq.271 This 
move, however, can have a potentially fatal impact on the case of individuals. It may be that a 
state does not generally harbour the conditions that are prone to facilitate the creation of 
refugee-producing circumstances but a person may nevertheless be subject to persecution on 
an individual level that is sufficient to incur the persecution label. An additional point of concern 
is that the inertia that is generally characteristic of particularly democratic legislative processes 
around the world may impede any undertaking to remove a state from that list if conditions were 
to arise within that country that is commensurate with persecution that would otherwise activate 
refugee producing conditions.  
 
4.2.4. International Zones 
 
Some countries, such as France, have also resorted to the practice of declaring the area within 
its international airports complexes as international zones to which the laws of the state does 
not apply.272 Persons seeking asylum can arguably henceforth not claim asylum or seek 
protection since they are theoretically not present on the territory of the state from which they 
are claiming the bundle of refugee protection.  The European Court of Human Rights has, 
however, had a say in this matter in the case of Amuur v. France,273 where they declared 
France‟s attempts to establish such an international zone at its Charles De Gaulle airport as 
illegal. It is pertinent to note here that France is also a democratic country who in this event 
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actively seeks to creatively interpret the international refugee regime and their concomitant 
responsibilities that they accepted thereunder and under other related human rights regimes.274 
 
4.2.5. Pre-Screening at Foreign Airports of Departure  
 
Authorities from states whom large numbers of potential asylum-seekers seek to enter are 
increasingly involved in pre-screening persons who board flights and other modes of transport 
to the authority‟s country of origin.275 This method of pre-screening takes place at the foreign 
airport, thus extra-territorially and is aimed at intercepting persons who may claim protection 
and asylum if they were otherwise to arrive on the territory of the country to which they seek 
entry.276 This practice of active prevention on the part of states evidently goes against the 
objects and purposes of the international refugee regime, human rights practices and in fact 
may also gravely stretch the bounds of human rights values held within such states that actively 
utilise such practices of pre-screening persons at foreign airports.  
 
4.3. Specific Instances of State Practice  
 
General instances of state practice within the field of refugee protection notwithstanding, a 
closer look at the related practices of the United States and Australia reveal a propensity by 
these states to creatively circumvent the ambit of their international obligations under the 
international refugee regime and the international human rights regime. Rather than providing 
an expansive review of these two states‟ practices and laws relating to refugee protection in 
particular and the wide-ranging refugee regime, the next two sections will be organised around 
specific instances of state practice that serves as cogent examples of general sentiments 
toward the plight of refugees whether unofficial (de facto) or officially so recognised (de jure). 
This focused approach will also be in line with McKeown‟s prompts that the operation of the 
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norm death-series is initiated around the occurrence of exogenous shocks,277 examples of 
which are the specific instances of state practice that will be highlighted hereunder. It must be 
cautioned here that these countries are not alone in their evasive practices but merely represent 
a snapshot of wider-ranging state practice, a particularly poignant set of snapshots given the 
democratic character of their respective governing institutions. 
 
4.3.1. Australia  
 
On the eve of the post Second World War era, Australia was heavily involved in establishing the 
international human rights regime that would eventually come into fruition u der the UN and the 
subsequent UDHR.278 Australia was one of eight states who initially drafted the UDHR in 
1948.279 Australia was also part of the initial group of countries that acceded to the 1951 
Refugee Convention.280 It is also salient to prominently note that Australia is also a mature 
liberal democratic state. The above facts lend itself to the logical conclusion that Australia is a 
country identified by an entrenched human rights-based regime and would therefore also 
adhere to the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the content of which is closely 
adjacent to the international human rights regime. This latter point is, however, not a foregone 
conclusion through deductive reasoning. In fact, Australia has most recently come under fire for 
“outsourcing its international obligations” and treating the international refugee regime and its 
central tenet of refugee protection a  both “expendable and avoidable”.281 Australia‟s actions in 
this field of operation is not, however, a recent venture but has been characteristic of Australian 
policy towards refugees most prominently since the 1970s beginning with the so-called 
Vietnamese “boatpeople”.282 The most recent, highly publicized incident that became known as 
the “Tampa Affair” of 2001 reignited Australian deterrence fervour towards persons who seek to 
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enter Australia illegally and claim asylum from the requisite authorities.283 The consequences 
flowing from this incident has had a far-reaching effect on the ability of displaced people to 
access refugee protection from Australia. 
 
The Tampa Affair brought Australia‟s practice towards refugees and asylum-seekers into stark 
international sight. The MV Tampa was a ship under Norwegian ownership and captaincy who 
came to the rescue of mostly Afghan and Iraqi civilians at sea.284 The civilians claimed they 
were refugees and requested, apparently somewhat forcibly, that the captain of the Tampa take 
them to Australia after the Captain initially tried to return them to the boat‟s country of origin, 
Indonesia.285 The Tampa arrived in Australian territorial waters near Christmas Island against 
the wishes of the Australian government.286 SAS troops boarded the Tampa in the interim and 
the asylum-seekers on-board the Tampa were transferred to the Australian ship HMAS 
Manoora. The HMAS Manoora was meant to transport the claimants to Papua New-Guinea and 
Nauru for processing.287 Legal challenges against Australia‟s actions ensued but were 
eventually rejected and the asylum-seekers were thus transported to Manus Island in Papua 
New-Guinea, Nauru and New Zealand for processing of their claims.288  
 
The asylum-seekers were to remain in detention until the status of the people‟s applications 
were reviewed.289 This period of time could stretch on indefinitely and although Australian law 
allows for automatic detention of all asylum-seekers and the 1951 Refugee Convention allows 
for detention in certain instances,290 the UNHCR has cautioned states that detention, where 
undertaken, should be for the shortest period possible and only in the most necessary of 
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circumstances.291 The length of detention aside, it is important to note that the processing 
centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea were financed by the Australian government and over 
time drew international criticism for its inhumane conditions, especially in Nauru where the 
detainment camps were built on the sight of an old abandoned mine.292    
 
The Australian government, while the Tampa incident was taking place, attempted to legislate 
on the issue of refugees and their access to Australian territory by allowing, amongst other 
measures, for the forcible removal of illegal entrants from Australian territorial waters.293 The 
proposed legislation was not adopted as it was considered by some, including the official 
opposition in Parliament at the time, to be too draconian in its scope.294  Beyond the Tampa 
incident, however, legislation was successfully introduced in the Australian Parliament in 2002. 
The consequent legislative scheme became known as the “Pacific Solution” and allowed for 
responses to asylum-seekers and other illegal immigrants that included interdiction at sea as a 
valid response to persons seeking to gain illegal entry into Australian territorial waters and the 
excision of over 3000 islands and outcroppings within Australian territory from the Australian 
migration zone such that persons were unable to claim asylum from the Australian authorities 
should they make their way to any of these excised areas.295 The former legislative point gave 
fruition to “Operation Relex”, an operation by the Australian military that saw the use of force to 
prevent boats from entering Australian territory.296  
 
Subsequent developments in the Australian response to displaced persons include the eventual 
closure of the processing facilities on both Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and Nauru by 
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2008.297 The closure of the processing centres did not mean that Australia slackened their 
response towards asylum-seekers. In 2011 Australia sought to complete a swop of such asylum 
seekers with Malaysia in what became known as the “Malaysia Solution.”298 The attempt of the 
Australian government was, however, thwarted by an Australian High Court ruling on two 
grounds: that the action would contravene domestic legislation that allows for “effective 
procedure for asylum”299 and that Malaysia was not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and therefore had no responsibility to provide protection to the asylum seekers from Australia.300 
 
The “Malaysia Solution” was short-lived as the Australian government failed to gain the support 
of the Parliamentary opposition to revive the deal with Malaysia. The opposition did, however, 
indicate their preference for offshore processing facilities in the spirit of the earlier Pacific 
Solution.301 The laws that were used by the High Court to strike d wn the Malaysia Solution 
were therefore repealed.302 This paved the way for the re-opening of the offshore processing 
facilities on Nauru and Manus Island to the great concern of the international community. In fact, 
the Australian Parliament passed affirmative legislation towards the realization of this goal on 16 
August 2012.303 The first group of asylum-seekers were to proceed to Nauru early September 
2012.304 Bill Frelick, director of the refugee programme for Human Rights Watch summed up the 
effect of Australia‟s latest legislative creativity: “Australia‟s new offshore processing law is a 
giant step backward in the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. Australia again seeks to 
shunt desperate boat people to remote camps, perhaps for years, to punish them for arriving 
uninvited by sea.”305  
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4.3.2. United States of America  
 
Chapter 3 considered the initial lack of international compliance by the United States to the 
refugee regime. This section will pay closer attention to the development of adherence to the 
refugee regime centred on two incidents or “exogenous shocks” as termed by Ryder McKeown, 
that is, the incident with Haitian refugees which culminated in the Supreme Court litigation of 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,306 in 1994 and the terrorist attacks which occurred on 11 
September 2001 in New York, the Pentagon and Pennsylvania.307 These incidents herald a time 
after the collapse of the Cold War. 
 
Since the advent of the 1990s, the United States has experienced particular instances of mass 
influx of persons from its neighbouring regions purporting to be refugees and therefore claiming 
asylum. Persons from Haiti, Cuba and South American countries such as Guatemala and El 
Salvador have attracted particular ire from US authorities and have prompted the initiation of 
creative evasive strategies to prevent persons emanating from these countries from shelving 
additional burdens related to refugee protection onto the United States.308 
 
The 1951 Refugee Convention does not directly address the issue of interdiction at sea, a 
practice which involves a potential host state sending naval vessels to intercept and ultimately 
send back persons on vessels, sometimes barely seaworthy ones, to the country from whence 
they came.309 The United States, however, has undertaken this practice particularly in relation to 
persons from Haiti and have either directly returned such individuals to Haiti or have entered 
them into protracted detention at the US base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.310 This policy of direct 
return was not only practiced under the presidency of George W. Bush, but also during the 
presidencies of Bill Clinton and G.H.W. Bush.311 President Reagan, to the contrary, believed 
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that the status of persons applying for asylum ought to be determined before action of any kind 
such as that undertaken by his successors were to be applied.312 
 
 The United States believes that such interdiction does not constitute a violation of its 
obligations under the norm of refugee protection or the broader 1951 Refugee Convention. This 
stance received support from the United States Supreme Court in the case of Sale v Haitian 
Centres Council when it ruled that interdiction at sea does not constitute a violation of the US‟s 
obligations as the action of interdiction does not constitute refoulement.313 This ruling has been 
widely condemned for making a mockery of the spirit, purport and objects of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.314 In the spirit of words penned by Jeremy Bentham, although not within the same 
context, the US Supreme Court‟s interpretation of the relevant provisions is “nonsense upon 
stilts” that implicitly sanctions actions that were part of the very reason why the idea of an 
international refugee regime was initiated after the Second World War.315 The questionable 
legality of the United States‟ practice notwithstanding, it has continued and was sanctioned by 
George W. Bush when he controversially stated that the Haitian people must know that they will 
be returned if they attempt to enter the United States in this manner.316 
 
The questionable treatment of Haitians b  the United States is but one instance of deliberate 
state practice that violates the tenets of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its central 
consideration of refugee protection. A second, more extensive breach of this central tenet was 
initiated by the response of the United States after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, a 
date that has gone down in infamy as 9/11.317 This date saw acts of unspeakable horror that 
traumatised countless people, not only in the United Sates but around the world. This impact 
notwithstanding, it is the subsequent actions taken by US authorities at the highest levels and its 
effect on the plight of refugees and asylum-seekers alike that is of concern here.  
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Around the time of 9/11, refugees from the Middle East were awaiting resettlement in the United 
States.318 A plane carrying these refugees arrived in the United States and concerned 
authorities alerted then Vice-President Dick Cheney as to the situation.319 Shortly after this 
notification the resettlement programme was suspended, being one of the first casualties of the 
post 9/11 response by the United States.320 Legislative and executive intent was not confined to 
this instance, however. Operation Liberty Shield was a particular instance where US authorities 
could legally detain persons claiming asylum for the duration of the process if they emanated 
from countries known to house Al Qaeda operations.321 The net of legislative reach was cast 
even wider with the passage of excessively broad anti-terrorism legislation that necessarily 
bought legitimate refugees and asylum-seekers within the ambit of anti-terrorism measures.322 
This moved the focus away from providing protection to refugees and asylum-seekers towards 
the control of their movements and ultimate deterrence of future asylum-seekers. An 
increasingly security-oriented view also began to equate the refugee condition with that of 
criminal activity, not only in the view of the US authorities but also increasingly within the minds 
of the US citizenry. 
 
The state of affairs propagated by the US authorities and the passage and implementation of 
far-reaching anti-terrorism legislation has created severe uncertainty within the United States as 
to the proper treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers.323 There have been some moves from 
certain avenues, however, that seeks to rectify the grievous deviations evident within the US 
refugee protection regime and its international obligations emanating from the 1951 Refugee 
Convention by way of its acceptance of the 1967 Protocol thereto.  
 
Senator Patrick Leahy, a democrat from Vermont,324 introduced a bill in Congress in 2010, the 
passage of which would bring US legislative practice closer towards its international 
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obligations.325 The bill was forwarded to the relevant congressional committee in 2010.326 The 
bill has not, however, moved beyond this stage of consideration and it is unlikely that it will enjoy 
any attention before the adjournment of the current congressional term. The bill would most 
likely, therefore, have to be re-introduced at a later date.  
 
The state of the United States‟ commitment to refugee protection is uncertain judging from its 
actions, notwithstanding its rhetoric surrounding the necessity of compliance with human rights 
(of which refugee protection is an adjacent field) both at home and by other countries.327 Judge 
Weinstein said it best when he stated that: “the United States cannot expect to reap the benefits 
of internationally recognised human rights…without able willing to adhere to them itself. As a 
moral leader of the world, the United States has obligated itself not to disregard rights uniformly 
recognised by other nations.”328 The Judge further cautioned that “this nation‟s [US] credibility 
would be weakened by non-compliance with treaty obligations or with international norms.”329  
 
It is clear from even the sparse discussion of the US refugee regime above that there are very 
evidently persistent lacunae in the US‟s domestic structure of refugee protection. These lacunae 
and failed attempts to ameliorate this adverse position can and most likely has prompted other 
states to follow suite and disregard their respective obligations towards refugees and asylum-
seekers thereby also challenging the intended content of the norm of refugee protection.  
 
4.4. Application of the Norm Death-Series 
 
The preceding overview of state practice, both in general and specific contexts provide a canvas 
upon which to impose the norm death-series theoretical framework as proposed by 
McKeown.330 The following section will consider each of the framework‟s three stages in light of 
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the information about state practice given in the preceding sections. It is important to note, 
however, that the actions of Australia and the United States are not necessarily the absolute 
trigger of other subsequent violations of the norm by other countries – it could rather be said 
that the actions of one such country is continually re-enforced by the actions of other states.  
Mutual re-enforcement is therefore the operational standard in the midst of  a lack of strong, 
fervent sanctions issued by one state against another state of similar democratic ilk in particular 
for fear of, most arguably, being labeled as hypocritical and espousing the virtue of double 
standards.   
 
4.4.1. Revisionist Challenge  
 
This stage marks the onset of the norm death-series and is most often initiated and driven by 
the occurrence of an exogenous shock to the system.331 There have been multiple shocks of 
this nature as it concerns the norm of refugee protection. Revisionists, the key actors in this 
stage of the norm death-series, respond to such exogenous shocks by re-framing existing 
norms accordingly. The exact contours of what constitutes an exogenous shock are not clearly 
defined. It can logically, however, be reasoned that an exogenous shock is an event which 
occurs that is out of the ordinary and challenges the continuation of the status quo, here 
adherence to the original norm of refugee protection. Certain exogenous shocks have been 
identified in the preceding sections, with the end of the Cold War being the first for the time 
period concerned. The Tampa affair involving Australia is the second such exogenous shock. 
The events of 9/11 and subsequently in Madrid on 11 March 2004,332 and in London on 7 July 
2005,333 is the third set of major events that has placed severe strain on the continuation of the 
intended refugee protection system as envisaged by the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
1967 Protocol thereto. The focus here will fall on the latter two sets of events with additional 
consideration of the general instances of state practice as mentioned earlier. 
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Security has certainly been a longstanding concern for all states within the international 
community, especially in the wake of the Cold War that raged from the 1950s to the end of the 
1980s.334 The events of 9/11, however, shone a blinding light on the shortcomings in state 
security, most prominently in the United States. The response to the events on this day was for 
norm-revisionists to re-frame the issue of refugee protection in the context of security interests 
away from the intended human rights framework.335 The consequence was that the norm of 
refugee protection that was always meant to be closely adjacent to the human rights paradigm 
was no longer one centred on extending assistance to those persons in need of protection by 
the mere fact of their human identity, but one centred on control of access, deterrence and 
security. Re-framing an issue in this manner can and indeed did ultimately result in the focus of 
concerned legislation and state practice, certainly within the United States and other closely 
allied states, to turn to securing themselves against future security breaches at the cost of 
extending its humanitarian assistance to persecuted individuals.336 
 
The identity of the norm revisionists responsible for re-framing the context of the refugee 
protection norm concerned can vary and includes in this instance, but is not limited to, first and 
foremost the state itself as represented by governmental authorities. These norm revisionists, in 
light of fear of foreigners and that they may be of the same ilk as those that perpetrated the 9/11 
attacks, arguably fed on and exploited the fear and anger of the broader citizenry to pass 
questionable legislation that served  to, amongst other things, subject legitimate refugees and 
asylum-seekers to harsh sanctions and procedures wholly inconsistent with the international 
framework laid out for the realisation of refugee protection thereby effectively criminalising 
otherwise legitimate refugees.337 The xenophobia-factor arguably also played a considerable 
part in the norm revisionist stage and undoubtedly also facilitated the willingness of the US 
citizenry to sanction the actions taken by their government in response to the 9/11 attacks, 
including suspending the resettlement programme, instituting Operation Liberty Shield338 and 
passing an array of overbroad anti-terrorism legislation.339 Trust in the government and the 
president in the United States in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was at an all-time 
                                                             
334 Tim Dunne, “Fundamental Hum Rights in Crisis after 9/11” (2007) 44 International Politics 269 at 272. 
335 Schoenholtz, supra note 39 at 330; Ibid. at 276. 
336 Scott D. Watson, The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats (New 
York: Routledge, 2009). 
337 Fullerton, supra note 323 at 8; Mathew, supra note 305 at 664. 
338 Schoenholtz, supra note 40 at 330. 












high thereby allowing far-reaching executive actions in addition to the legislative agenda alluded 
to above.340 
 
The concern with state security subsequent to the events of 9/11 and others such as the Madrid 
attacks in 2004 and the London attacks in 2005, does not, however, provide the only impetus for 
re-envisioning the content of the norm of refugee protection.341 This latter point is witnessed by 
the practices perpetrated by Australia in the wake of the Tampa Affair.342 The Australian 
experience is crucial to mention at this stage of the norm death-series since it gives credence to 
the warning issued by McKeown in that the possible impact of democratic states‟ actions in 
relation to human rights based norms may logically have a far greater impact on the 
international system than would the actions of a pariah state in the same human rights 
paradigm.343 This point arguably places Australia within the norm revisionist camp as the 
treatment it has extended and is currently extending towards persons seeking asylum, 
challenges the foundation of democratic state identity – the respect for human rights.  
 
The nature of the detention that Australia has and plans to institute again against asylum 
seekers that arrive in its territory illegally can be considered, and indeed is by some, as 
amounting to cruel and inhumane punishment and arbitrary detainment – the very values that 
are entrenched in  a democratic state‟s identity. This criticism draws its motivation from the 
indefinite period of time that persons may be detained and has been detained in the past in 
questionable circumstances on Nauru and Manus Islands.344 The practice of interdiction at sea, 
in the similar vein as that practiced by the United States, also suggests that Australia is 
proactively seeking to redefine refugee protection in ways that detach it from its human rights 
foundations. This unquestionably makes both the United States and Australia guilty of violating 
the principle of non-refoulement, a central tenet of refugee protection. 
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Cumulatively, since both the United States and Australia are mature liberal democracies, their 
creative practices in recent times in particular have served to stimulate a reconsideration of the 
norm of refugee protection in light of security and deterrence instead of its initial human rights-
based foundations. This conclusion does not categorically mean that there are no other norm 
revisionists. The United States and Australia do, however, serve as strong examples even in the 
midst of criticism from prominent human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights‟ Watch. The criticism leveled against such norm revisionists as the United States 
and Australia, although legitimate, has not been overtly successful in changing state practices of 
these states who merely continue in their practices unabated.345 This state of affairs is 
reminiscent of McKeown‟s assertion, in the context of the anti-torture norm, that exposing state 
practices that do not comport with international and domestic standards of appropriateness was 
not successful in curbing state practice that violated the initial norm of anti-torture and 
subsequently eroded its content.346  
 
4.4.2. Reverse Cascade 
 
It has been established earlier in this research that the reverse cascade stage is comprised of 
two consecutive stages; domestic and international legitimacy crises. Both sub-stages are 
evident in the abounding practices contrary to the initial norm of refugee protection. 
 
Norm revisionist arguably achieved a victory in re-framing the context of the norm of refugee 
protection to the extent that a reverse cascade was initiated, first in terms of a domestic crisis of 
legitimacy, not only in the United States and Australia but further afield in other democratic 
countries especially in Europe, and then in an international crisis of legitimacy. The domestic 
crisis of legitimacy was initiated and maintained by the initial norm of refugee protection losing 
salience amongst domestic role-players. 
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The occurrence of a domestic crisis of legitimacy is not difficult to envision within the US context 
in light of the support from a large portion of the citizenry, fuelled by fervent feelings of 
patriotism and xenophobia in some instance not only in relation to the 9/11 attacks but also in 
the context of the long-standing hot button issue of immigration that always plays a central role 
in election debates. The support made the passage of pernicious legislation and executive 
orders commensurately easier. The extent of the challenge posed to the original norm of 
refugee protection in light of the vast amounts of support for actions taken in the post-9/11 era 
drowned-out the new set of responses‟ detractors. People who, during the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, questioned governmental authority and actions, were confronted with being labelled as 
un-American, something supported by George W. Bush‟s pronouncement of “either you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists”.347 The proponents of a security-oriented policy towards 
foreigners of any kind therefore arguably drowned-out the voices of detractors. 
 
The Australian government initially proposed draconian legislation to retroactively legitimise 
actions taken against the asylum-seekers of the Tampa. The legislation was, however, opposed 
by opposition parties in the country‟s Legislature. Subsequent actions in the Australian 
Legislature and public opinion polls,348 however, suggest that a domestic legitimacy crisis was 
successfully initiated and continues to this day with the newly enacted legislation, with the 
support of the opposition, to re-open offshore processing centres for persons that illegally arrive 
in Australia. Public opinion has also drifted progressively towards resentment of illegal foreign 
arrivals that, according to a 2012 United Nations poll, are regarded by two thirds of Australians 
as “queue jumpers”.349 The changing sentiments of the Australian government and the citizenry 
of Australia indicate that the norm of refugee protection as a matter of human rights concern is 
under severe pressure and prone to a domestic crisis of legitimacy. Similar sentiments abound 
in other democratic countries such as France that subscribe to some of the general practices 
listed earlier in this chapter and even South Africa which is a relatively young democracy that 
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saw heinous xenophobic attacks against foreigners , especially refugees from central and 
northern Africa.350  
 
The realisation of numerous domestic crises of legitimacy does not, however, guarantee a 
subsequent cumulative international crisis of legitimacy.351 The nature of the norm challenged in 
this research and the identity of the states who pose the challenge to the continued salience of 
the norm in the first place does, however, go a long way in contributing to the occurrence of an 
international crisis of legitimacy. McKeown cautions in his article that the anti-torture norm may, 
at the time of his writing, not yet be subject to an international crisis of legitimacy but that if 
states that carry significant normative weight in terms of their liberal democratic identity, and 
therefore expected adherence to the anti-torture norm, choose to emulate the United States to 
challenge the continued salience of the norm under consideration, an international crisis of 
legitimacy within the norm will most likely ensue.352 This reasoning is wholly relevant to the case 
of the refugee protection norm and the violation of its basic tenets by states who were 
previously general adherents to its precepts. These states in the majority also ascribe to a 
liberal democratic state identity, and therefore their violation of the norm of refugee protection as 
originally envisioned is particularly disconcerting and exerts more influence on the continued 
salience of the norm than would the violation by a known pariah state who has almost never 
ascribed to the human rights regime, never mind the refugee regime that flows from it. If China 
were, for example, to violate the tenets of refugee protection, especially that of non-refoulement, 
as they do by returning defectors from North Korea to that country without a second thought,353 
its non-adherence to the intended refugee protection framework would attract international 
scorn but would not necessarily carry substantial impact on the continued salience of the norm 
of refugee protection. 
 
The general instances of state practice addressed earlier in this chapter also contribute to 
establishing a domestic crisis of legitimacy, in particular, in other liberal democratic states. This 
cumulatively contributes to support an ultimate international crisis of legitimacy, a crisis whose 
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potency is further supported by the fact that many of these states who contribute to the new 
system of evasive strategies were previously adherents to the refugee regime and indeed its 
initiators in the case of Western European states in particular. This has arguably also spawned 
the emulation of non-adherence by other states. The international character of the refugee 
protection norm is therefore under severe strain with its continued existence in its intended form 
uncertain. 
 
It is important to note here that even in the midst of states passing a Resolution in the United 
Nations General Assembly in 2001 upon the 50th anniversary of the existence of the 1951 
Refugee Convention,354 the contrary practices of states continues. This would suggest a 
divergence between state practice and state rhetoric, an imminently dubious state of affairs that 
further shows the insincerity of states to uphold the human rights informed norm of refugee 
protection. 
 
4.4.3. Norm Expiration  
 
Theoretically a norm that expires ceases to exist, with a new norm taking its place. The nature 
of norms associated with human rights and refugee protection in particular are very contentious 
as shown earlier in this research. There could arguably, therefore, be parties who hold an 
opposing viewpoint on the continued salience of norms emanating from this field. It is therefore 
pertinent to mention that even though the norm of refugee protection as initially intended is more 
probably than not suffering the throes of expiration due to the overwhelming contrary practice of 
states that carry a tremendous amount of normative weight, there are still some NGOs and 
organised citizen groups that hold the view of the norm of refugee protection as initially 
established. The ability of sections of the population to still hold their views even amidst the 
expiration of a norm is reminiscent of the contentious character of democratic politics, an 
identity feature of the states most responsible for the erosion of the initial norm of refugee 
protection. Whether or not a norm therefore expires is a question of probabilities and cannot 
arguably ever be conclusively proven.  
 
                                                             












Overall, the fact that the norm of refugee protection still enjoys some salience amongst certain 
entities such as NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and the citizenry of 
various countries, speaks against its expiration. The question that should be considered here, 
however, is what level of impact the dissent of such entities in actual fact has on the probability 
of the norm expiring. States are the main purveyors of power in the international system and it 
has become increasingly difficult to curtail their actions, especially those who wield the most 
amount of power. The economic uncertainty and heightened security concerns in an ever-more 
hostile world and the adverse impact this has had on the willingness of states to co-operate for 
mutual benefit in an international organisation like the UN have all contributed to this state of 
affairs. 
 
Additionally, even though there may still be some NGOs and citizenry around the world who 
hold the norm or refugee protection in high regard, the events that bought about the 
intensification of security concerns, think 9/11, and subsequent responses by states through 
clever use of language and legislation has arguably desensitized persons to the prominence of 
human rights and the norm of refugee protection. This is borne out by the question when 
considering torture as to whether the torture of an individual is justifiable if that means the lives 
of many innocent people will be saved. There is also, arguably, an innate fear and intolerance of 
foreigners for reasons ranging from the sense that foreigners in the ilk of refugees are 
necessarily terrorists or that they will disturb the existing fabric of society.  This sense has also 
precipitated outbreaks of xenophobia. Furthermore, the acknowledgement by leaders such as 
Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron that multiculturalism has failed in their 
respective states serves to suggest that a welcoming nature towards foreigners is no longer 
prominent.355 Overall therefore, it is highly probable that the norm of refugee protection within a 
sense of human rights is fast approaching expiration for numerous and interrelated reasons. 
  
4.5. The Emergence of a New Norm 
 
Even though the norm of refugee protection is not necessarily fully expired, it is still prudent to 
consider whether a new norm of refugee protection is emerging. It is feasible that the two 
                                                             












processes of norm expiration and norm emergence can co-exist for some time since the 
reasons underlying the regression of the norm sets the stage for the development of a new 
norm, that is, there are inter-related causes at work. This arguably reflects the fluid nature of 
international relations and human society both of which do not operate according to a fixed 
spectrum of consecutive stages of development. Deviations should therefore be 
accommodated.  
 
In relation to the preceding paragraph, it has been seen from the above arguments that the 
norm of refugee protection with its foundations in the human rights regime is under severe strain 
and the mere fact that its prominent detractors emanate from within a group of countries that 
ought to be its main proponents suggests that the norm will not recover unless these states 
change their actions, which is highly unlikely given the domestic support in these states and the 
perceived lack of sanctions against these states that would normally  adhere to actions that 
violate the tenets of refugee protection and human rights. Furthermore, the shift in international 
relations to include rising powers such as China with different conceptions of and adherence to 
human rights and refugee protection may contribute to perceptions that the norm will not 
recover but will rather be reformulated in the image of security and deterrence.356  
 
Additionally, a point that ought to be considered here is whether the norm under contention is a 
wholly new norm or is simply adapting itself to existing circumstances. It has been seen that 
states are engaging in behaviour that are not appropriate according to the precepts of the initial 
norm of refugee protection, that together with the fact that the underlying precepts of human 
rights is essentially being replaced by that of security and deterrence leads one to conclude that 
a new norm is emerging and not simply adapting. Furthermore, the shift in international relations 
to include rising powers such as China, Brazil and India and strong regional and economic-
based groupings suggests that different norm entrepreneurs may also come into play.357 
Different organisational platforms may also be engaged as the efficacy of the UN has come 
under repeated scrutiny in recent years. 
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Given this above, it is still feasible within the context of this research to propose that the norm of 
refugee protection as it was crafted in the context of human rights, has been placed on a new 
trajectory of change with norm entrepreneurs actively re-defining its context, actions which may 
eventually precipitate the realisation of a tipping point and a norm cascade and eventual norm 
internalisation in the format of the norm life-cycle theoretical framework. These latter 
propositions are, however yet uncertain but should certainly prompt future research. 
 
There are some concerns relating to the continued adherence to the initial norm of refugee 
protection by non-state entities, including the citizenry of various states that could challenge the 
assertion that a trajectory of change in the sense of a new norm and not simply adaptation 
thereof is at play. The relative strength or potency of their ability to translate their dissent onto 
the international stage is apposite here since the framework used deals with international 
norms. However, security is a well-financed global enterprise with strong lobbies thus it is highly 
improbable that dissenting non-state entities will be able to ffectively challenge the emerging 
norm centred on security and deterrence. It is for this very reason, also, that even if the norm 
were to be maintained by its non-state proponents that a new norm would still  feasibly develop, 
a new norm that is not simply a reversion to a previous state but one in a different context of 
operation. 
 
4.6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has sought to lay out the argument supporting the assertion that the norm of 
refugee protection that was envisaged in chapter 3 of this research is well and truly under 
intense pressure - pressure emanating from states that ought to be its main proponents. The 
norm death-series was applied to various instances of state practice, more specifically the 
actions of the United States and Australia, and it was subsequently asserted that the tenets of 
the norm death-series was and is still being fulfilled. It was further asserted that a new norm of 
refugee protection informed by security concerns and consequent deterrence is under 
construction, a norm whose content is not simply a reversion to a prior state of existence of the 
norm of refugee protection. A consideration of the latter, it is proposed, is possible if one 

















The field of international relations and its identifying concepts are unlike definitive mathematical 
formulas that are able to prove the existence and character of numerous entities. The best 
outcome that can be hoped for within the broader social science field and indeed the sub-fields 
of international relations and international law is an approximation of a decisive answer or at the 
very least an elimination of what the answer is clearly not thereby moving one step closer to a 
more credible one. The truth is that however much scholars have sought to solidify concepts 
and seek answers within the international relations and international law fields, true answers will 
still most often remain elusive, that is, ultimately, answers to questions within international 
relations and the broader social science field will most likely, to some degree, be mutually 
exclusive from scenario to scenario. Answers to proposed research problems are therefore 
comprehensibly prisoners of context in both time and place. It is within this understanding of the 
quest for answers within particularly the field of international relations and equally that of 
international law that the conclusions of this research into the existence and evolution of a norm 
of refugee protection ought to be seen. 
 
This research has presented the over-arching research aim of tracking the evolution of the norm 
of refugee protection. This task has required a consideration of not only theoretical models and 
concepts within the field of international relations but also of concepts and understandings 
prevalent within the field of international law. The models within the confines of international 
relations that were used are respectively the norm life-cycle theoretical model and the norm 
death-series model, both of whom are situated within the Constructivist school of thought. 
Definitional concepts such as refugee, protection, asylum and non-refoulement that are more 
prominently concepts found within international law scholarship were also crucial in addition to 
the concepts more commonly identified with the operational field and research agenda of 
international relations such as norms, socialization, and others.  In many areas these two areas 












disciplinary research. In this vein, the research conducted within the confines of the research 
aims drew models and concepts from both fields to suggest feasible conclusions to the research 
aims and concomitant questions.   
 
After a holistic consideration of the context of the over-arching research fields within which this 
research was conducted, a number of conclusions in relation to the research questions posed 
were reached that could further the research agenda on many fronts in hopes of arriving at even 
more well-refined conclusions than those presented collectively within this chapter. A re-
affirmation of these conclusions is now apposite. Subsequent research avenues are also 
suggested by the conclusions presented. 
 
The first research aim of this paper was to establish the existence of a norm of refugee 
protection during the early and subsequent stages of the human rights regime following the end 
of the Second World War in 1945. The conclusion presented in chapter 3, in due cognizance of 
the application of the norm life-cycle, suggested the existence of such a norm of refugee 
protection founded on the precepts of human rights norms.  
 
The second research aim of this paper was to show that the norm of refugee protection as 
advanced under the first aim was and still is being challenged to the extent that its salience has 
eroded to severe levels thereby propagating the eventual death of the norm. This aim was 
facilitated by the application of the norm death-series, again with some criticisms against the 
model being kept in mind. The conclusion presented in chapter 4 suggests that the norm of 
refugee protection under its initial conception has been placed under severe strain by the 
actions of states that should in actual fact be supportive of the norm‟s initial conception as one 
based in recognition and respect for human rights.  This severe strain furthermore suggests the 
eventual expiration of the norm of refugee protection as suggested by the norm death-series. 
 
The third research aim of this paper was to consider whether a new norm of refugee protection, 
informed by a different set of values than the initial norm of refugee protection, has been 












expiration of the initial norm of refugee protection notwithstanding, since concurrent existence 
for a time in the change-over period of both norm expiration and norm emergence is arguably 
possible. A new norm that is informed by the concepts of national security and deterrence could 
therefore be under development. It was also asserted that due to the fundamental change in 
underlying precepts and the already deviant behaviour exhibited by a large number of states 
that the new norm is not simply an adaptation but a fundamental change thereof. 
 
Cumulatively, taking into regard the research aims of this paper and all the arguments and facts 
presented herein, the research paper does in fact undertake what the title of this research 
suggests. The research paper does indeed track the evolution of the norm of refugee protection 
over time. The process of tracking is not however a finite one and should continue beyond the 
purview of this paper. However, that is a task for another day. 
 
5.2. Further Research 
 
Cumulatively, this research paper merely represents a snapshot of an issue that ought to be 
investigated in much greater detail through more intense and critical consideration of the 
theoretical frameworks that have been applied here. The avenues here that may prove fruitful to 
investigate further include the perceived state-centric nature of the frameworks, the rigid 
application of each stage of both frameworks in consecutive and not concurrent stages, and the 
nature of norm internalisation. An investigation of a greater spectrum of countries and their 
respective practices within the context offered by the frameworks would also be helpful. A closer 
scrutiny of the continued salience of the international refugee regime as it is constructed under 
international law is also necessary for the purposes of reflecting changing beliefs within the 
international community. This latter point would include an investigation into the definition of a 
refugee, amongst other things. 
 
If all of these suggestions were to be heeded, then an even more intensive argument may be 
presented in support of the aims of this research paper. Further research in this field is crucial 












near or far future in the midst of more and more conflicts both within and between countries. 
The prescribed length of this paper does not, however, allow such thorough consideration but 

















Alborzi, M.R.  Evaluating the Effectiveness of International Refugee Law: The Protection of Iraqi 
Refugees (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006). 
 
Betts, Alexander and Loescher, Gil. eds., Refugees in International Relations (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
 
Bohmer, Carol & Shuman, Amy. Rejecting Refugees: Political Asylum in the 21st Century (New 
York: Routledge, 2008). 
 
Brownlie, Ian. Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
 
Dugard, John. International Law: A South African Perspective, 3rd ed. (Lansdowne, South Africa: 
Juta, 2005). 
 
Harris, D.J. Cases and Materials on International Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010). 
 
Hathaway, James C.  The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
 
Helton, Arthur C.  The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
Loescher, Gil. Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New 
York: Oxford University Press: 1993). 
 














Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).  
 
Nicholls, David. Adolf Hitler: A Biographical Companion (California: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2000). 
 
Price, Matthew E.  Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
 
Rourke, John T. International Politics on the World Stage, 12th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2008). 
 
Schofield, P. et al., eds.,The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford, 2002). 
 
Sells, Michael A. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Los Angeles, 
California: University of California Press, 1998). 
 
Skogstad, Grace. ed., Policy Paradigms, Transnationalism and Domestic Politics (Canada: 
UTP, 2011). 
 
Watson, Scott D. The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking 




Arulanantham, Ahilan T. “Restructured Safe Havens: A Proposal for Reform of the Refugee 
Protection System” (2000) 22(1) Human Rights Quarterly 1. 
 
Barnett, Laura. “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime” 
(2002) 14 (2–3) International Journal of Refugee Law 238. 
 
Bertrand, Pierre. “An Operational Approach to International Refugee Protection” (1993) 26 












Betts, Alexander. “The International Relations of the „new‟ extraterritorial approaches to refugee 
protection: explaining the policy initiatives of the UK Government and UNHCR” (2004) 22 (1) 
Refuge 58. 
 
Betts, Katharine. “Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia” (2001) 9(4) People and Place 34. 
 
Chimni, B.S. “Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection” (2000) 13 
(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 243. 
 
Collinson, Sarah. “Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, „Safe Third Countries‟ and 
„Readmission‟: The Development of an Asylum „Buffer Zone‟ in Europe” (1996) 21(1) 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers New Series 76. 
 
Cortell, Andrew P.  & Davis Jr., James W. “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International 
Norms: A Research Agenda” (2000) 2(1) International Studies Review 65. 
 
Crock, Mary. “In the Wake of the Tampa: Conflicting Visions of International Refugee Law in the 
Management of Refugee Flows” (2003) 12 Pacific Rim Journal of Law and Policy 49. 
 
Dacyl, Janina W. “A Time for Perestroika (Restructuring) in the International Refugee Regime?” 
(1990) 3(1) Journal of Refugee Studies 26. 
 
Dunne, Tim. “Fundamental Hum Rights in Crisis after 9/11” (2007) 44 International Politics 269. 
 
Dunstan, Richard. “United Kingdom: Breaches of Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention” 
(1998) 10(1-2) International Journal of Refugee Law 205. 
 
Edwards, Alice. “Tampering with Refugee Protection: The Case of Australia” (2003) 15 (2) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 192. 
 
Feller, Erika. “Asylum, Migration and Refugee Protection: Realities, Myths and the Promise of 













Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” 
(1998) 52 (4) International Organization 887. 
 
Finnemore, Margaret E. & Sikkink, Kathryn. “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International 
and Regional Politics” (1999) 51(159) International Social Science Journal 89. 
 
Fitzpatrick, Joan. “Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention” (1996) 9 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 229. 
 
Fitzsimmons, Scott.  “A Rational-Constructivist Explanation for the Evolution and Decline of the 
Norm against Mercenarism” (2009) 11(4) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 1. 
 
Florini, Ann. “The Evolution of International Norms” (1996) 40 International Studies Quarterly 
363. 
 
Fullerton, Maryellen. “Terrorism, Torture and Refugee Protection in the United States” (2010) 29 
(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 4. 
 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. “Commentary: Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers” (1985) 26 
Virginia Journal of International Law 897. 
 
Hailbronner, Kay. “Non-Refoulement and „Humanitarian‟ Refugees: Customary International law 
or Wishful Legal Thinking” (1985) 26 Virginia Journal of International Law 857. 
 
Hathaway, James C. & Neve, R. Alexander. “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: 
A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection” (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 115. 
 
Howard, Jessica. “To Deter and Deny: Australia and the Interdiction of Asylum Seekers” (2003) 
21(4) Refuge 35. 
 
Huber, Stacy. “Refugees in the U.S.: Protected from Persecution, or Vulnerable to Unjust 













Ingebritsen, Christine. “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia‟s Role in World Politics” (2002) 37(1) 
Cooperation and Conflict 11. 
 
Johnson, Vincent Robert. “The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens of 1789, 
the Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris” (1990) 13(1) Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 1. 
 
Kerwin, Donald. “The Use and Misuse of „National Security‟ Rationale in Crafting U.S. Refugee 
and Immigration Policies” (2005) 17(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 749. 
 
Kjaerum, Morten. “Refugee Protection Between State Interests and Human Rights: Where is 
Europe Heading?” (2002) 24(2) Human Rights Quarterly 513. 
 
Ku, Agnes S. “Immigration Policies, Discourses, and the Politics of Local Belonging in Hong 
Kong (1950-1980)” (2004) 30(3)   Modern China 326. 
 
Legomsky, Stephen H. “The USA and the Caribbean interdiction Program” (2006) 18 
International Journal of Refugee Law 677. 
 
March, James G. & Olsen, Johan P. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders” (1998) 52(4) International Organization 943. 
 
Mathew, Penelope. “Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa” (2002) 96 
American Journal of International Law 661. 
 
Mathews, Jessica T. “Power Shift” (1997) 76(1) Foreign Affairs 50. 
 
McKeown, Ryder.  “Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm” 
(2009) 23(1) International Relations 5. 
 
North, Justice A.M.  & Bhuta, Nehal. “The Future of Protection – The Role of the Judge” (2000-













Parrish, Michael J. “Redefining the Refugee: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
Basis for Refugee Protection” (2000) 22 Cardozo Law Review 223. 
 
Pizor, Andrew G. “Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: The Return of Haitian Refugees” (1993) 
17(4) Fordham International Law Journal 1062. 
 
Prince, Richard. “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines” 
(1998) 52(3) International Organization 613. 
 
Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” (1988) 
42(3) International Organization 427. 
 
Raymond, Gregory A. “Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms” (1997) 
41(2) Mershon International Studies Review 205. 
 
Reus-Smit, Christian. “International Crises of Legitimacy” (2007) 44 International Politics 157. 
 
Rosenblum, Marc R.  & Salehyan, Idean. “Norms and Interests in US Asylum Enforcement” 
(2004) 41(6) Journal of Peace Research 677. 
 
Salehyan, Idean & Rosenblum, Marc R. “International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Asylum 
Admissions in the United States” (2008) 61(1) Political Research Quarterly 104. 
 
Schoenholtz, Andrew I. “Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11” (2004-
2005) 36 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 323. 
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of 
Global Government Networks” (2004) 39(2) Government and Opposition 159. 
 
Wendt, Alexander.  “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics” (1992) 46(2) International Organization 391. 
 















“Australia to Send Asylum Seekers to Nauru this Week” BBC News (10 September 2012), 
online: BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19540463.  
 
“China and India: Contest of the Century” The Economist (19 August 2010), online: The 
Economist <http://www.economist.com/node/16846256>; “Asia‟s Balance of Power: China‟s 
military Rise” The Economist (7 April 2012), online: The Economist 
http://www.economist.com/node/21552212.  
 
Cowell, Alan. “After Coordinated Bombs, London Is Stunned, Bloodied and Stoic” The New York 
Times (7 July 2005), online: The New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/07/international/europe/07cnd-explosion.html?_ 
r=0&pagewanted=all.   
 
Gordon, Michael. “Refugees are 'Boat People' to Most, UN Survey Finds” The Sydney Morning 




Kleinfield, N.R. “A Creeping Horror: Buildings Burn and Fall as Onlookers Search for Elusive 
Safety” The New York Times (12 September 2001), online: The New York Times 
www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/nyregion/12SCEN.html.  
 
“Leahy Introduces Landmark Refugee Protection Act” (15 March 2010), online: Senator Patrick 
Leahy: United States Senator for Vermont http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-introduces-
landmark-refugee-protection-act.  
   
Quinn, Andrew.  “U.S. readies food aid for North Korea, with conditions” Reuters (29 February 
2012), online: Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/us-korea-north-food-
idUSTRE81S2EY20120301. 
 
Rummery, Ariane. “Australia‟s „Pacific Solution‟ Draws to a Close” (11 February 2008), online: 












Sang-Hun, Choe. “China Should Not Repatriate North Korean Refugees, Seoul Says” The New 




Sciolino, Elaine. “Spain Struggles to Absorb Worst Terrorist Attack in Its History” The New York 
Times (11 March 2004), online: The New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/11/international/europe/11CND-TRAI.html.  
  
“Syrian President Condemns Houla Massacre, Rejects Accusations” CNN (3 June 2012), 
online: CNN http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/03/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html.   
 
“Thousands Flee South Africa Attacks” BBC News (19 May 2008), online: BBC News 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7407914.stm.  
 
“US 'ties North Korea food aid to nuclear progress'” BBC News (29 February 2012), online: BBC 
News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17201046. 
 
Vinocur, John. “For Europe, Few Hints of Tolerance” The New York Times (1 August 2011), 
online: The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/world/europe/02iht-
politicus02.html?pagewanted=all.  
 
Worsnip, Patrick. “Clinton: U.S. Must Learn from Emerging Economies” Reuters (14 October 
2011), online: Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/14/us-usa-clinton-
idUSTRE79D2R520111014. 
 
Yinan, Hu. “Myanmar set to regain international aid” China Daily (6 April 2012), online: China 
Daily   http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-04/06/content_14991615.htm. 
 
Treaties and Conventions  
 
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered 













Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7.  
 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 20 December 
1988, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 497 (entered into force 11 November 1990).  
 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987). 
 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September 1969, 
100 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force 20 June 1974). 
 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into 
force 22 April 1954). 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. 
T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368. 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 16 December 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S.3. 
 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into 
force 4 October 1967). 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 
27 January 1980). 
 
UN General Assembly Resolutions and Other Declarations 
 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in 
Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984, online: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36ec.html. 
 
Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, GA Res. 429(V), UN GAOR, 5th Sess., 












Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res. 428(V), 
UN GAOR, UN Doc. A/RES/428(V) (1950). 
 
UN GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/187 (2002). 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, 
UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71. 
 
 
International Judicial Decisions 
 
Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Judgement of 
12 November 1991, [1991] I.C.J. Rep. 53. 
 
Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement of 25 
September 1997, [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 7. 
 
 




Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 




Hart-Cellar Act, INS, Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911. 
 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 125 L. (92-344), 509 
U.S. 155 (1993); Pizor, supra note 214 at 1064-1065. 
 
The Constitution of the United State of America. 
 












Miscellaneous Documents and Internet Sources 
 
“Australia and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights”, online: Australian Human Rights 
Commission  http://www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/UDHR/Australia_UDHR.html. 
 
“Australia: „Pacific Solution‟ Redux” Human Rights Watch (17 August 2012), online: Human 
Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/17/australia-pacific-solution-redux.  
 
Bush, President George W.  “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People” 
(20 September 2001), online: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/‟news/ 
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.    
 
Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings - George W. Bush”, online: Gallup 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx.  
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: China, online: Human Rights Watch 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-china.  
 
Human Rights Watch, World Reports 2012: North Korea, online: Human Rights Watch 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-north-korea.  
 
Letter from Bill Frelick, Refugee Program Director for Human Rights Watch and Brad Adams, 
Asia Division Executive Director to António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (13 June 2011) online: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/13/letter-unhcr-regarding-
refugeeasylum-seeker-exchange-agreement-between-australia-and. 
 
List of States Party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, online: United Nations 
Treaty Collection http://treaties.un.org.   
 














Ogata, Sadako. “Upholding international refugee protection principles today” (Address to the 
Law Association for Asia and the Pacific 18th Conference, delivered at Tokyo, Japan, 
September 2003), online: http://www.unhcr.or.jp/protect/pdf/sept03ms_ogata.pdf. 
 
Refugee Council USA, History of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, online: Refugee 
Council USA http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page=history.  
 
“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: History of the Document”, online: United Nations 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml. 
 
UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Final Act 
of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, 25 July 1951, A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1, online: UNHCR 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/40a8a7394.html.   
 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of 
Non-Refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol, 26 January 2007, online: UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=45f17a1a4&page=search.   
 
UN High Commission for Refugees, Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria 
and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, 21 
September 2012, online: UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html.  
 
UN High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
UNCHROR, 54th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 9(d), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998) 
 
UN High Commission for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees , January 1992, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1., online: UNHCR 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b3314.pdf.   
 













US State Department, Refugee Admissions, online: US State Department 
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/index.htm.   
